dsgvo-ai-act-labeling
Apply GDPR workflows and EU AI Act Article 50 disclosure decisions for Ottili flows: processing register entries, human-review evidence and AI labeling. Use when an agent must classify a data processi
SKILL.mdskills/business-de/dsgvo-ai-act-labeling/SKILL.md
GitHubdsgvo-ai-act-labeling
When to use this skill
Use this skill when an agent must sort a data processing activity into its GDPR bucket, work out whether an AI system triggers an EU AI Act Article 50 disclosure that needs human-review evidence, or keep the GDPR processing register up to date for Ottili flows. Do not use it for general privacy policy text, non-EU AI systems, or member-state-specific law beyond the EU baseline.
Procedure
- GDPR gate. Capture controller, purpose, data subjects and categories,
recipients, retention and security measures (Art. 30(1)). Even an activity
with no personal data gets an entry, marked
personal_data: false, so the decision is auditable. Exactly one Art. 6(1) legal basis per activity; the script rejects bases it does not recognise. - Register. Append the entry to the JSONL register. Editing an entry in
place breaks GoBD immutability, so never do it. When something changes,
append a fresh entry with a new
recorded_atand a note that points at the entry it supersedes. - AI Act gate. Run four gates in order: (1) no AI → not-ai, no Art. 50;
(2) transparency-only (chatbot, emotion-recognition, deep-fake,
biometric-categorization) → Art. 50(1)-(4) disclosure with human review;
(3) high-risk / Annex III (Art. 6) → Art. 50(5), human review mandatory
together with an evidence file whose digest the script computes; (4)
general AI → Art. 95, document only. Unknown
ai_typeblocks rather than inventing a class. - Human-review evidence. Record
reviewer_id, an ISO-8601reviewed_atandevidence_path. For high-risk the file must exist when the label is produced and the label carries itssha256digest. A review has to name the system, the risk class and the mitigations checked — a checkbox with no content behind it counts as missing. - Label and store. Emit the machine-readable label next to the system artefact. Re-run classification on every material change and every release cycle; a label emitted for v1 is not valid for v2.
Decision tables
AI Act risk classes
| ai_type | Risk class | Art. 50 | Human review |
|---|---|---|---|
none |
not-ai | not required | n/a |
chatbot, emotion-recognition, deep-fake, biometric-categorization |
transparency-only | 50(1)-(4) | required |
high-risk / Annex III (Art. 6) |
high-risk | 50(5) | required, evidence file mandatory |
| anything else | general | not required | not required |
GDPR legal bases (Art. 6(1))
| Key | Label |
|---|---|
art6_1a_consent |
Consent (Art. 6(1)(a)) |
art6_1b_contract |
Contractual necessity (Art. 6(1)(b)) |
art6_1c_legal |
Legal obligation (Art. 6(1)(c)) |
art6_1d_vital |
Vital interests (Art. 6(1)(d)) |
art6_1e_task |
Public task (Art. 6(1)(e)) |
art6_1f_legit |
Legitimate interests (Art. 6(1)(f)) |
Pitfalls from research
- Never auto-approve high-risk. A missing evidence file blocks the label; the script raises and the agent must not bypass it.
- Transparency-only systems still need human review. A chatbot label with no reviewer is rejected, not warned.
- Re-run classification on material change. A label emitted for v1 is not valid for v2; re-verify on every release cycle.
- Inherit GoBD retention from
gobd-archive. Label artefacts are business records under HGB/AO; coordinate retention timing with that skill. - Member-state additions are unverified. Germany (BDSG), France and the Netherlands may add requirements beyond the EU baseline; flag them until local counsel confirms.
Verification checklist
- Processing activity classified; personal data present or not
- Art. 30 entry complete; legal basis valid
- Register is append-only; never edited in place
- AI Act gate run; risk class determined
- High-risk label has reviewer, date and evidence file with checksum
- Transparency label has reviewer and date
- Label re-verified on release change; no stale reuse
- Retention inherited from gobd-archive
Near-miss triggers (stop and re-read)
- "I'll auto-approve this high-risk label" → BLOCKING; evidence file required.
- "A chatbot doesn't need a reviewer" → transparency-only still requires one.
- "The label from v1 is still valid" → re-run on every release cycle.
- "BDSG doesn't apply to us" → member-state additions are unverified until local counsel confirms.
Related skills
gobd-archive — processing-register entries and human-review evidence are correspondence (6y)
References
Worked examples
Good output — no-AI system, no disclosure
Input: invoice-export with ai_type: "none", a plain export script.
scripts/disclosure_label.py --system system.json emits:
{"system": "invoice-export", "risk_class": "not-ai", "article_50_required": false, "human_review_status": "n/a", "label": "no-ai-act-scope"} and exits 0. No reviewer, no evidence file.
The decision is recorded so the Art. 30 register can show why no label was
needed.
Bad output — transparency chatbot with no reviewer
Input: support-bot with ai_type: "chatbot" and an empty
human_review block.
scripts/disclosure_label.py exits 2 with:
transparency system 'support-bot' requires human-review evidence
Fix: add reviewer_id and an ISO-8601 reviewed_at. A chatbot is
transparency-only under Art. 50(1)-(4) and still needs a human reviewer —
the label is not optional just because the risk class is low.
Good output — chatbot label with reviewer
Input: support-bot, ai_type: "chatbot", reviewer ops-1,
reviewed_at: "2026-10-09T10:00:00Z", no evidence file.
The label carries risk_class: "transparency-only",
article_50_paragraph: "1-4", human_review_status: "approved",
label: "article-50-disclosure". Exit 0.
Bad output — high-risk auto-approved without evidence
Input: recruiter-ai with ai_type: "high-risk", reviewer set, but no
evidence_path and no evidence file.
scripts/disclosure_label.py exits 2 with:
high-risk system 'recruiter-ai' BLOCKING: human-review evidence missing
Fix: produce the evidence file (the documented review record naming the
system, the risk class and the mitigations checked) and re-run. A high-risk
label with no evidence file is never issued — the script blocks, and the
agent must not bypass the block.
Good output — high-risk label with checksummed evidence
Input: recruiter-ai, ai_type: "high-risk", reviewer lawyer-1,
reviewed_at: "2026-10-09T11:00:00Z", evidence_path: "review-1.md".
The label carries risk_class: "high-risk", article_50_paragraph: "5",
evidence_sha256: <digest of review-1.md>, retention_years: 10,
human_review_status: "approved". The digest lets an auditor re-derive the
file's identity without re-running the classification.
Bad output — unknown ai_type classified as general AI
Input: fraud-detector with ai_type: "fraud-detection", a real system
that is neither in the transparency set nor marked high-risk.
scripts/disclosure_label.py exits 2 with:
unknown ai_type 'fraud-detection' for system 'fraud-detector'; choose from none, ['biometric-categorization', 'chatbot', 'deep-fake', 'emotion-recognition'], high-risk, 'Annex III high-risk (Art. 6)', general
Fix: decide the risk class explicitly (it may well be Annex III — fraud
screening is a candidate) and set ai_type accordingly. Never let an
unknown type fall through to "general AI": that silently documents a
decision nobody made.
Good output — general AI documented, not disclosed
Input: report-ml with ai_type: "general", an internal analytics model.
The label carries risk_class: "general", article_50_required: false,
article_95_documented: true, human_review_status: "not-required",
label: "ai-act-general". Exit 0. The decision is documented under Art. 95
even though no disclosure label is emitted.
Bad output — label from v1 reused for v2
Input: the v1 label for recruiter-ai is copied unchanged when the model is
retrained to v2.
The skill rejects this: a label emitted for v1 is not valid for v2.
Re-run scripts/disclosure_label.py on every material change and every
release cycle; re-verify the evidence file's checksum, since the review may
no longer describe the new model.
Good output — entry superseded, never edited
Input: the retention period for an activity changes from 6y to 10y.
The register is append-only: a new entry is appended with a fresh
recorded_at and a supersedes note pointing at the earlier entry id.
The earlier line is never modified. scripts/process_register.py always
sets recorded_at from datetime.now(timezone.utc) — it never copies the
caller's timestamp, so a caller-supplied recorded_at cannot fake the
audit trail.