tradecraft-attack-chain

Orchestrate a full multi-stage kill chain — recon → initial access → privilege escalation → lateral movement → objective — with phase gates, per-phase playbooks, and operating discipline. Load on pent

SKILL.md

GitHub

Kill-chain orchestration

When it applies

An authorized pentest (never bug bounty — persistence and lateral movement exceed program scopes) whose objective spans stages: "external to domain admin", "full internal pentest", "I have a webshell — what's the route", a red-team exercise. tradecraft-attack-scenarios turns the objective into an ordered plan and tradecraft-attack-path-mapping models the graph; this skill is the execution layer — phase gates, per-phase playbooks, and the discipline that keeps a multi-day operation coherent. Single-stage tasks skip it and go straight to their domain skill (web-*, ad-*, cloud-*).

Why it works

Multi-stage engagements fail by drift, not by missing techniques. Re-planning at each phase gate — what do I hold, what does it unlock, what's the cheapest next edge — reaches the objective with least action and noise. The kill chain is a routing spine; each phase delegates to the specialist skills that own the technique, and a blocked phase reroutes instead of grinding.

Method

Full playbooks (web→DC, phishing→internal, proximity, cloud, AD CS) and the state→next-step decision matrix: cheatsheet.md.

  1. Gate: scope first. Load tradecraft-scope-roe; confirm the signed scope in engagements/<target>/scope.txt. Persistence, EDR evasion, and log tampering need explicit written authorization — assumed only under a red-team RoE, never by default.
  2. Recon (recon-*): subdomains → live hosts (httpx) → ports (naabu/nmap) → tech fingerprint (nuclei -tags tech). Prioritize test/dev/staging environments and newly deployed systems; mine leaks (recon-github-code-leaks) for cloud keys, connection strings, JWT secrets. Gate: asset list + ranked candidate leads in plan.md.
  3. Initial access — highest-signal vector first: known-vuln components (nuclei -severity critical,high), the web classes (web-sqli, web-ssti, web-file-upload, web-ssrf → cloud-imds-ssrf for cloud creds), perimeter appliances (network-appliance-attacks), exposed services (network-service-attacks), or phishing/physical when the RoE includes them (social-eng-* — load social-eng-methodology first). Gate: a foothold with proven command execution.
  4. Privilege escalation (privesc-enumeration before any exploit): Windows token abuse (privesc-windows-tokens), sudo/SUID (privesc-linux-gtfobins), cloud IAM (cloud-iam-privesc). Gate: admin/SYSTEM/root, or a more powerful identity than before.
  5. Lateral movement — loot credentials (privesc-enumeration, mimikatz/secretsdump), then move: ad-* (Kerberoasting, delegation, DACL, ADCS), network-ntlm-relay, WinRM/SSH, and network-pivoting-tunneling for segmented networks. BloodHound drives the path (tradecraft-attack-path-mapping). Gate: every hop is a validated edge, not an assumption.
  6. Objective — reach what the engagement exists to prove: domain admin, the data store, the crown-jewel system. Prove with the least data possible (anonymize any proof data). Implants/persistence only if the RoE authorizes them and a cleanup date is agreed.
  7. Close out — remove every artifact you introduced (accounts, uploads, scheduled tasks, beacons, dropped tools, added SSH keys), restore what you changed, reconcile against your activity log. Then reporting-evidence-review → reporting-pentest-report.

Re-plan at every gate: a blocked phase routes back through tradecraft-pivot-decisions to the next-best edge.

Gotchas

  • Don't blast the whole chain with automation against a domain — an unscoped scanner run is how engagements end careers. Work the asset list, phase by phase.
  • One failed technique ≠ blocked phase — work the variation matrix (House rules) and the alternate edges before declaring a gate unpassable.
  • High-risk actions (DCSync, golden ticket, log tampering) need explicit RoE coverage — if it isn't written down, don't do it; propose it to the client instead.
  • Honeypots: an oddly open share or a too-tempting credential is a trap — verify before you use it.
  • Never touch availability or real user data — no DoS, no mass exfiltration.
  • Classic failure modes to avoid: mimikatz dumps left on disk, C2 on a threat-intel-burned domain, phishing that trips DLP because the gateway was never tested, lateral movement that springs a honeypot.

Verify success

Every phase gate has a written pass/fail in plan.md; the path from first foothold to objective is reproducible edge by edge; all introduced artifacts are removed and accounted for; the evidence chain survives reporting-evidence-review.

References

MITRE ATT&CK tactics; PTES; tradecraft-attack-scenarios, tradecraft-attack-path-mapping, tradecraft-complex-engagements.


Portions adapted from reverse-skill by zhaoxuya520, MIT License.