defense-forensics
Deep forensic artifact analysis after triage — memory dumps (Volatility 3), disk and super-timelines (Plaso), PCAP (tshark), and Windows host artifacts (Zimmerman toolset) — with hashing and chain of
SKILL.mdskills/defense/defense-forensics/SKILL.md
GitHubDeep forensic artifact analysis
When it applies
Triage (defense-dfir-triage) has scoped the incident and you now hold preserved evidence —
a memory dump, a disk image (E01/raw), a PCAP, or exported host artifacts — and must prove,
artifact by artifact, what the attacker did: which process ran, what persisted, what left the
network. This is deep analysis of dead-box/dead-disk evidence, not live first response.
Why it works
Attackers can delete logs, but memory, filesystem metadata ($MFT, USN journal), and packet captures retain artifacts the attacker never controlled. Parsing them with purpose-built tools reconstructs execution, persistence, and exfiltration even after the live system was cleaned — and hashing plus chain of custody makes the conclusions defensible.
Method
- Preserve before you parse. SHA-256 every image/capture, record timezone + acquisition command, work on a copy with the original read-only. Write chain-of-custody notes into your timeline as you go — every conclusion must trace back to an artifact path.
- Memory (Volatility 3) — situational awareness first, then chase anomalies:
Follow withvol -f mem.dmp windows.info # OS profile, build, timezone vol -f mem.dmp windows.pslist # processes — unknown names, odd parents vol -f mem.dmp windows.netscan # connections — beacons, lateral SMB/RDP vol -f mem.dmp windows.cmdline # full command lineswindows.malfind(injected code) anddlllist/handleson suspects; dump a suspicious PID (--pid <pid> --dump) fordefense-malware-triage/reverse-eng-malware. - Disk & super-timeline — run Plaso (
log2timeline.py) over the image and filter around the known-bad window in Timeline Explorer; correlate $MFT, USN journal, Shimcache, Amcache, and Prefetch into one ordered view. Autopsy / FTK Imager for carving and deleted files. - Windows host artifacts (Eric Zimmerman's toolset) — the execution/persistence core:
- Execution: Amcache, Prefetch, BAM, Shimcache.
- Persistence: Run keys, services, scheduled tasks, WMI subscriptions.
- Logs: Security, PowerShell 4104 script-block, Sysmon — feed
defense-log-analysis.
- Network (PCAP) —
tsharkconversation/protocol/DNS statistics first, then carve suspicious streams and export objects. Custom protocol payloads →reverse-eng-protocol; C2 implants →defense-malware-triage. - Hand off — extract IOCs with confidence + provenance, map to ATT&CK, feed detections to
defense-detection-sigma, and runreporting-evidence-reviewbefore the incident report.
Gotchas
- Never analyze the original — one mount without a write blocker and the evidence is challengeable. Hash first, analyze a copy, re-hash after to prove nothing changed.
- Timezone skew kills timelines — Volatility, Plaso, and event logs each default differently; normalize everything to UTC before correlating.
- Wrong Volatility profile = garbage output — confirm
windows.infobefore trusting pslist. Linux/macOS dumps need symbol tables (ISF) built for that exact kernel. - Prefetch proves execution happened, not who ran it — corroborate with logs/accounts.
- Absent artifact ≠ absent activity — log clearing and timestomping are themselves findings; record gaps explicitly instead of reading them as "clean".
- Raw IOCs can tip the attacker or leak victim data — grade and redact before sharing.
Verify success
A reviewable timeline (Time | Host | Artifact | Finding | Confidence | Evidence path) where every claim names the artifact that proves it, before/after analysis hashes match, and IOCs + ATT&CK mapping are ready for detection engineering and reporting.
References
Volatility 3 docs; Plaso/log2timeline; Eric Zimmerman's tools; SANS DFIR posters; NIST SP 800-86.
Portions adapted from reverse-skill by zhaoxuya520, MIT License.