private-l1-metadata-leakage
Use when the agent must understand the privacy limits of a "private"/permissioned Avalanche L1 — what still leaks even with restricted RPC (insiders, validators, node operators, logs) — and how to def
SKILL.mdskills/private-l1-metadata-leakage/SKILL.md
GitHubPrivate L1 — Metadata & Data Leakage
Overview
A permissioned/private L1 provides access privacy (a walled garden), not data privacy. Even with restricted RPC ([[restrict-rpc-access]]), plenty is visible inside the wall. Know these limits before calling a chain "private."
What still leaks on a private L1
- Plaintext to all participants. Anyone with RPC access reads all balances, txs, and contract state. There is no encryption.
- Validators & node operators see everything — transactions, state, and (at the node) mempool and peer info.
- Logs & backups. Node logs, snapshots, and explorer/indexer instances persist plaintext data.
- The transaction graph among participants is fully visible to insiders.
- Operational metadata. Who runs which validator, deployment patterns, and timing.
Threat model by adversary
| Adversary | Sees |
|---|---|
| Outsider (no RPC) | nothing (if RPC truly restricted) |
| Authorized participant | all on-chain data (plaintext) |
| Validator / node operator | all data + mempool/peer metadata |
| Compromised RPC gateway | everything flowing through it |
Defense in depth
- Add data privacy. Deploy eERC on the L1 so even insiders can't see amounts/balances ([[combining-eerc-with-private-l1]]).
- Least-privilege RPC. Per-member credentialed gateways, not a shared endpoint ([[restrict-rpc-access]]).
- Harden node infra. Restrict log retention, secure snapshots/backups, lock down explorer/indexer access.
- Compartmentalize. Separate chains per trust domain if participants shouldn't see each other's data.
- Govern operators. Vet validator/node operators; they are trusted parties.
Decision: is a private L1 enough?
- Outsiders are the only threat → private L1 alone may suffice.
- Participants must not see each other's data → private L1 + eERC (or FHE) is required.
Common Pitfalls
- Marketing "private" = "encrypted." It isn't; insiders see plaintext.
- Trusting node operators implicitly. They see everything.
- Forgetting logs/backups/explorers as leak vectors.
AI Agent Prompt
"Act as a privacy auditor for a permissioned L1. Enumerate what still leaks (insiders, validators, logs, backups, graph) despite restricted RPC, and design defense in depth including eERC for data confidentiality."
References
See references/README.md (academy permissioning 'access vs data privacy', node chain-configs).