eerc-privacy-threat-model

Use when the agent must reason precisely about what eERC hides vs what it leaks — encrypted amounts/balances vs visible sender/receiver/timing/graph — and how to mitigate metadata and correlation atta

SKILL.md

GitHub

eERC — Privacy Threat Model

Overview

eERC encrypts values, not the fact that you transacted. Designing a private system requires knowing exactly where the boundary is, or you will leak through metadata even though balances are encrypted.

What is HIDDEN

  • Token balances (encrypted ElGamal ciphertext on-chain).
  • Transfer / mint / withdraw amounts.
  • Total supply in standalone mode ([[eerc-hidden-supply]]).

What is VISIBLE (on a public chain)

  • That a transaction occurred and which eERC function was called.
  • Sender and recipient addresses (the from/to of the tx and the registered parties).
  • Timing, frequency, ordering, and gas of operations.
  • The transaction graph — who interacts with whom, how often.
  • Converter deposits/withdrawals touch the public ERC-20, exposing on/off-ramp amounts at the boundary ([[eerc-deposit-withdraw]]).

Attack surface

Attack Mechanism Mitigation
Graph analysis from/to addresses reveal relationships fresh/stealth addresses; route through a private L1 ([[combining-eerc-with-private-l1]])
Timing correlation deposit then transfer of similar timing add delays/batching; avoid 1:1 patterns
Amount fingerprinting unique on/off-ramp amounts at converter boundary standalone mode; vary amounts; avoid round numbers
Network metadata RPC provider sees IP + queries self-hosted/private RPC ([[anonymity-network-privacy]])
Endpoint compromise client-side key theft key hygiene ([[eerc-key-management]])

Standalone vs converter (privacy)

  • Standalone: strongest — no public-token boundary, hidden supply. Prefer for max privacy.
  • Converter: weaker at the edges — deposits/withdrawals interact with the visible ERC-20; amounts can leak at on/off-ramp.

Hardening

  1. Run eERC on a private L1 to also hide the graph/timing from outsiders.
  2. Use fresh addresses per counterparty/context.
  3. Prefer standalone when you don't need a public base asset.
  4. Treat the converter boundary as the riskiest point; batch/normalize amounts.

Common Pitfalls

  • "It's encrypted, so it's private." Amounts are; the relationship graph is not.
  • Linkable amounts. Encrypted balances still correlate if your amounts are unique identifiers.
  • Ignoring the public ERC-20 side in converter mode.

AI Agent Prompt

"Act as a privacy threat analyst. Given my eERC design, enumerate what stays hidden vs what leaks (addresses, timing, graph, converter boundary) and recommend concrete mitigations."

References

See references/README.md (academy 'How private is the blockchain', eERC technology-behind).