anonymity-network-privacy
Use when the agent must address network-layer privacy for Avalanche privacy apps — RPC providers seeing IP and queries, address clustering, mempool exposure, and using private RPC / relayers / account
SKILL.mdskills/anonymity-network-privacy/SKILL.md
GitHubAnonymity & Network-Layer Privacy
Overview
On-chain encryption (eERC) and access control (private L1) don't cover the network layer. The RPC you talk to, your IP, your address reuse, and the mempool all leak metadata that can deanonymize otherwise-confidential activity. This skill closes that gap.
Leak vectors
- RPC provider visibility. A public RPC sees your IP address, the addresses you query, and the transactions you broadcast — linking your identity to your on-chain activity even if amounts are encrypted.
- Address clustering. Reusing one address across contexts links them; funding patterns tie addresses to a real identity.
- Mempool exposure. Pending txs reveal sender/intent before inclusion (on chains with a public mempool).
- Frontend/RPC fingerprinting. Wallet + dApp + RPC combination can fingerprint users.
Mitigations
- Use private/self-hosted RPC. Run your own node or a trusted private endpoint so a third party isn't logging your IP + queries. On a private L1, give each member a credentialed gateway ([[restrict-rpc-access]]).
- Fresh addresses. Use a new address per counterparty/context to break clustering ([[eerc-privacy-threat-model]]).
- Network anonymity. Access RPC over VPN/Tor where IP exposure is a concern.
- Relayers / account abstraction. Submit transactions via a relayer or ERC-4337 paymaster so the broadcasting address/IP isn't the user's — reduces sender-side metadata.
- Avoid leaky reads. Balance/state queries to a public RPC reveal interest in specific addresses; route reads through your own node too.
Layered privacy stack
| Layer | Tool |
|---|---|
| Token value | eERC ([[eerc-introduction]]) |
| Transaction context | encrypted metadata ([[eerc-encrypted-metadata]]) |
| Who can read the chain | private L1 / restricted RPC |
| IP / RPC metadata | private RPC, VPN/Tor, relayers (this skill) |
| Address linkage | fresh/stealth addresses |
Common Pitfalls
- Encrypting on-chain but using a public RPC. The provider links your IP to your addresses — a major leak.
- Single reused address. Clusters all your private activity.
- Ignoring the mempool/reads. Both leak intent.
AI Agent Prompt
"Act as an opsec engineer for a confidential dApp. Identify network-layer leaks (RPC/IP, address reuse, mempool) and implement mitigations: private RPC, fresh addresses, VPN/Tor, and relayer/AA submission."
References
See references/README.md (network privacy synthesis; restrict-rpc-access, threat-model skills).