writing-suricata-and-snort-rules

Writes and validates Suricata/Snort IDS rules for network-based malware detection, covering rule anatomy, content/pcre matching, flow and threshold options, and common mistakes that cause false positi

SKILL.md

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Writing Suricata and Snort Rules

When to Use

  • You need to author IDS rules to detect C2 traffic, malware downloads, or exploit attempts from observed network indicators.
  • You want to validate rule syntax and avoid the patterns that cause false positives or silent non-matching.

Do not use broad content matches on common substrings that will flood alerts — anchor with flow direction, ports, offsets, and uniqueness. This skill builds and lints rules; deploy them through your IDS change process.

Prerequisites

  • The indicators to detect (URI, host header, TLS SNI/JA3, byte pattern) and a target IDS (Suricata or Snort).

Workflow

Step 1: Draft the rule

Choose action, protocol, addresses/ports, direction, and a unique msg, sid, and rev. Add content/pcre matches anchored with http.uri, tls.sni, flow:established,to_server, and offsets/depths.

Step 2: Lint the rule

python scripts/analyst.py lint rules.rules

Checks for required fields (msg, sid, rev, classtype), balanced quotes/parentheses, non-anchored overly short content, and duplicate SIDs.

Step 3: Tune to reduce noise

Add threshold/detection_filter, flowbits, and specific buffers (http.host, dns.query) to scope matches.

Step 4: Document and stage

Record what each rule detects and stage it for testing against a pcap before production.

Validation

  • Every rule has msg, a unique sid, and a rev.
  • content matches are anchored (buffer/offset/flow) rather than free-floating short strings.
  • Rules parse without unbalanced quotes/parentheses.

Pitfalls

  • Free-floating content:"GET" style matches creating massive false positives.
  • Duplicate or reused SIDs causing rule-load conflicts.
  • Forgetting flow:established and matching on unrelated traffic directions.

References