hunting-lateral-movement-over-smb-and-wmi
Hunts for lateral movement via remote service creation, admin share writes, and remote WMI process creation by correlating Windows logon, service install, and process-creation events. Activates for re
SKILL.mdskills/hunting-lateral-movement-over-smb-and-wmi/SKILL.md
GitHubHunting Lateral Movement Over SMB and WMI
When to Use
- You have Windows logon (4624), service install (7045/4697), and process-creation telemetry and want to detect remote execution tools (PsExec, WMIexec, SMBexec) moving between hosts.
- You are reconstructing an attacker's east-west movement.
Do not use this to alert on all Type 3 logons — network logons are normal. Hunt the service-creation, admin-share, and remote-WMI patterns that accompany them.
Prerequisites
- Logon (4624 Type 3), service install (7045/4697), and process-creation events.
Workflow
Step 1: Correlate remote-execution indicators
python scripts/analyst.py hunt events.csv
Flags PsExec-style service installs (PSEXESVC, randomly named services running from ADMIN$),
remote WMI parents (wmiprvse.exe spawning cmd/powershell), and named-pipe service binaries.
Step 2: Build a movement graph
Group by source account and target host to see fan-out across systems.
Step 3: Confirm
Distinguish admin tooling from intrusion by account, timing, and target breadth.
Step 4: Operationalize
Write Sigma rules for PsExec service creation and wmiprvse.exe child shells.
Validation
- Remote service installs are flagged by image path/name patterns, not service installs broadly.
wmiprvse.exe-parented shells are correlated with the originating account where possible.- Findings map to ATT&CK T1021.002/.003.
Pitfalls
- Legitimate admin/management software using PsExec or remote WMI.
- Renamed PsExec service binaries evading name checks.
- Missing the logon-to-execution correlation across separate event sources.
References
- See
references/api-reference.mdfor the hunter. - ATT&CK T1021.002 and Event 4624/4697 docs (linked in frontmatter).