hunting-lateral-movement-over-smb-and-wmi

Hunts for lateral movement via remote service creation, admin share writes, and remote WMI process creation by correlating Windows logon, service install, and process-creation events. Activates for re

SKILL.md

GitHub

Hunting Lateral Movement Over SMB and WMI

When to Use

  • You have Windows logon (4624), service install (7045/4697), and process-creation telemetry and want to detect remote execution tools (PsExec, WMIexec, SMBexec) moving between hosts.
  • You are reconstructing an attacker's east-west movement.

Do not use this to alert on all Type 3 logons — network logons are normal. Hunt the service-creation, admin-share, and remote-WMI patterns that accompany them.

Prerequisites

  • Logon (4624 Type 3), service install (7045/4697), and process-creation events.

Workflow

Step 1: Correlate remote-execution indicators

python scripts/analyst.py hunt events.csv

Flags PsExec-style service installs (PSEXESVC, randomly named services running from ADMIN$), remote WMI parents (wmiprvse.exe spawning cmd/powershell), and named-pipe service binaries.

Step 2: Build a movement graph

Group by source account and target host to see fan-out across systems.

Step 3: Confirm

Distinguish admin tooling from intrusion by account, timing, and target breadth.

Step 4: Operationalize

Write Sigma rules for PsExec service creation and wmiprvse.exe child shells.

Validation

  • Remote service installs are flagged by image path/name patterns, not service installs broadly.
  • wmiprvse.exe-parented shells are correlated with the originating account where possible.
  • Findings map to ATT&CK T1021.002/.003.

Pitfalls

  • Legitimate admin/management software using PsExec or remote WMI.
  • Renamed PsExec service binaries evading name checks.
  • Missing the logon-to-execution correlation across separate event sources.

References