hunting-fileless-and-in-memory-threats
Hunts for fileless and in-memory threats by correlating PowerShell script-block logs, encoded-command usage, in-memory loading patterns, and registry-resident payloads from Windows telemetry. Activate
SKILL.mdskills/hunting-fileless-and-in-memory-threats/SKILL.md
GitHubHunting Fileless and In-Memory Threats
When to Use
- You have PowerShell script-block logs (4104), process telemetry, and registry-write events and want to detect fileless execution that leaves little on disk.
- You are hunting reflective loading, in-memory .NET execution, and registry-resident payloads.
Do not use this to alert on all PowerShell use — hunt the in-memory loading and encoded-payload patterns specifically.
Prerequisites
- 4104 script-block logs and/or process and registry telemetry (CSV/JSON).
Workflow
Step 1: Hunt in-memory loading patterns
python scripts/analyst.py hunt events.csv
Flags [Reflection.Assembly]::Load, VirtualAlloc/WriteProcessMemory via PowerShell,
Invoke-Expression of decoded blobs, DownloadString+IEX, and large base64 in script blocks.
Step 2: Detect registry-resident payloads
Surface writes of large encoded blobs to HKCU\Software\... Run-adjacent or custom keys (fileless
storage).
Step 3: Confirm
Correlate script-block content with the parent process and subsequent network/child activity.
Step 4: Operationalize
Write detections for reflective loading and base64-heavy script blocks.
Validation
- Flags are based on in-memory loading/encoded-payload patterns, not PowerShell presence.
- Registry-resident payload detection keys on large encoded values.
- Findings map to ATT&CK T1620/T1059.001/T1112.
Pitfalls
- Legitimate admin scripts using
Invoke-Expression— corroborate with content/parent. - Obfuscated script blocks splitting indicators across logs.
- Constrained Language Mode evasions changing the observable API surface.
References
- See
references/api-reference.mdfor the hunter. - ATT&CK T1620 and script-block logging docs (linked in frontmatter).