hunting-dns-tunneling-and-exfiltration
Detects DNS-based tunneling and data exfiltration in DNS logs: scoring high query volume to single domains, long/high-entropy subdomains, unusual record types, and encoded payload labels. Activates fo
SKILL.mdskills/hunting-dns-tunneling-and-exfiltration/SKILL.md
GitHubHunting DNS Tunneling and Exfiltration
When to Use
- You have DNS query logs (resolver, Zeek
dns.log, Windows DNS) and want to find tunneling or exfiltration over DNS. - You are testing a hypothesis that an implant uses DNS as a covert channel.
- You need to rank domains by tunneling indicators across many queries.
Do not use query length alone as a verdict — CDNs, antivirus lookups, and some SaaS use long encoded labels legitimately; combine entropy, volume, and record-type signals.
Prerequisites
- DNS logs with query name, query type, source, and timestamp, over a meaningful window.
- A way to whitelist known-benign high-volume domains (security vendors, CDNs).
Workflow
Step 1: Aggregate by registered domain
Group queries under their registered/parent domain so per-domain volume and subdomain diversity are visible.
Step 2: Score tunneling indicators
Weight: high unique-subdomain count, long average label length, high subdomain entropy (encoded
data), heavy TXT/NULL/CNAME usage, and high query rate to one domain.
python scripts/analyst.py hunt dns.json
Step 3: Estimate exfiltration volume
Sum encoded bytes implied by query lengths per domain; sustained high volume to a single nameserver suggests data egress.
Step 4: Whitelist and pivot
Remove known-benign high-entropy domains; for survivors, check domain age/registration, the authoritative nameserver, and the originating host.
Step 5: Confirm and respond
Validate by decoding sampled labels where possible and correlating with host activity; escalate confirmed tunnels and write a detection.
Validation
- High-score domains combine multiple signals (entropy + volume + record type), not one alone.
- Benign high-volume domains are whitelisted, keeping the list reviewable.
- Confirmed tunnels tie to a specific host and a young/suspicious domain.
Pitfalls
- Flagging long labels from CDNs and AV telemetry as tunneling.
- Aggregating by full FQDN instead of registered domain, hiding subdomain diversity.
- Ignoring record type;
TXT/NULLcarry far more data thanArecords.
References
- See
references/api-reference.mdfor the DNS hunt scorer. - ATT&CK T1071.004 and T1048 (linked in frontmatter).