br-hmac-signature

Configure Better Route 1.1 HMAC authentication for webhooks and server-to-server REST requests. Use when signing request timestamps, methods, paths, raw bodies, optional query strings, rotating key ID

SKILL.md

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Better Route HMAC request signatures

Use HMAC for a shared-secret webhook or back-channel client. Attach the middleware and mark the raw route as middleware-protected; HMAC is authentication, not a public-route exception.

use BetterRoute\Middleware\Auth\ArrayHmacSecretProvider;
use BetterRoute\Middleware\Auth\HmacSignatureMiddleware;

$hmac = new HmacSignatureMiddleware(
    secrets: new ArrayHmacSecretProvider([
        'primary' => MY_PLUGIN_WEBHOOK_SECRET,
        'next' => MY_PLUGIN_WEBHOOK_SECRET_NEXT,
    ]),
    replayWindowSeconds: 300,
    algorithm: 'sha256',
    signQueryString: true
);

$router->post('/webhooks/provider', $handler)
    ->middleware([$hmac])
    ->protectedByMiddleware('hmacAuth');

Canonical string

The client must sign the exact raw request body and construct:

timestamp + "\n" + UPPERCASE_METHOD + "\n" + path + "\n" + sha256(rawBody)

With signQueryString: true, append a fifth line containing the recursively key-sorted query encoded by PHP http_build_query(). Both client and server must use the same nested-array and space-encoding rules. Query parameters are unsigned by default, so enable this option or keep every security-relevant value in the signed body.

Default headers are X-Signature, X-Timestamp, and X-Key-Id. The signature accepts hex, Base64, or Base64URL, optionally prefixed with <algorithm>=. Prefer one documented client encoding even though the server accepts several.

Security rules

  • Generate high-entropy secrets and keep them out of source control and logs.
  • Rotate keys by accepting old and new key IDs briefly; remove the old key after rollout.
  • Use HTTPS. HMAC authenticates content but does not encrypt it.
  • A timestamp window limits delayed replay but does not prevent two identical requests inside the window. Combine writes with atomic idempotency or a single-use-token store when duplicate execution is unsafe.
  • Sign the raw transmitted bytes. JSON re-encoding, changed whitespace, or a different path causes a legitimate signature to fail.
  • Never choose the secret from request data except through a reviewed HmacSecretProviderInterface key-ID lookup.

After verification, Better Route 1.1 writes provider: hmac and subject: <key-id> into the shared auth context and adds an hmac attribute. Audit and rate-limit middleware can use that identity.

Test missing headers, unknown key ID, malformed and out-of-window timestamps, altered body/path/query, key rotation, and an unsigned-route configuration mistake.

Source references: src/Middleware/Auth/HmacSignatureMiddleware.php, src/Middleware/Auth/HmacSecretProviderInterface.php, src/Middleware/Auth/ArrayHmacSecretProvider.php.

References