compliance

Customer-facing compliance duties that code runs: the subprocessor list and its automatic 30-day DPA notice, and the audit evidence it leaves. Load WHENEVER you add, remove or change a subprocessor (a

SKILL.md

GitHub

Compliance

The Data Processing Addendum (DPA) promises two things that code keeps:

  • Section 7.2 / Annex III: /legal/subprocessors lists every third party that processes customer personal data.
  • Section 7.3: a new subprocessor gets at least 30 days' notice before it processes customer personal data.

Add a subprocessor

A new vendor that sees customer data is a subprocessor: a model provider for Kortix-managed models, a host, an email, log or analytics vendor. A model a customer reaches with their own key is not one.

  1. Sign or accept the vendor's DPA. For an inference vendor, confirm zero data retention for our account.
  2. Add the row to packages/shared/src/subprocessors.ts. Use the vendor's legal entity name from its terms. Set addedOn to the day the PR merges. Move SUBPROCESSORS_UPDATED to the same day.
  3. Merge to dev. The row ships with the next prod release.
  4. Send the vendor no customer data before the row's effective date (addedOn + 37 days). The page shows it as "From <date>". Managed-model inference is served by Platinum Inference: give the Platinum team the same date, and Platinum Inference holds the change back until then.

A change to an existing row (purpose, location) needs no addedOn and sends no email. Removing a vendor needs no notice: delete the row.

What runs by itself

runSubprocessorNoticeSweep (apps/api/src/billing/services/subprocessor-notices.ts) runs hourly in the billing worker, on prod only (INTERNAL_KORTIX_ENV=prod).

  • A row is open from the first sweep that sees it on prod until its effective date. The release has 7 days to reach prod, so every customer gets 30 to 37 days.
  • Each open notice goes once to the owners and admins of every paid account (credit_accounts.tier not free or none). Reply-To is privacy@kortix.com: a reply is an objection.
  • Each notified account gets an audit event legal.subprocessor_notice.sent (resource_id = addedOn, output_summary = recipient count, effective date, vendor names). The customer sees it in the account's audit log.
  • privacy@kortix.com gets one report per sweep that sent. Subject "Subprocessor notice gave only N days" means the release took more than 7 days: hold the vendor until 30 days after that report and move addedOn.

Evidence for an auditor

select account_id, created_at, output_summary
from kortix.audit_events
where action = 'legal.subprocessor_notice.sent' and resource_id = '<addedOn>'
order by created_at;

The privacy@kortix.com reports give the per-sweep totals.

Tests

apps/api/src/__tests__/integration-subprocessor-notices.test.ts: pnpm test -- --db-only integration-subprocessor-notices.

Staff access to a customer account (act-as)

A platform admin enters a customer account only through an act-as grant (kortix.impersonation_grants, apps/api/src/shared/impersonation.ts). There is no other door: the read-only x-kortix-admin-bypass header was retired on 2026-10-19 and the API ignores it.

  • Two entry points, one grant: Admin → Accounts → Open as account ({account_id}), and "Open as admin" on a project's access screen ({project_id}; the API resolves the project's account).
  • A grant lives at most 1 hour. The web app shows a banner while it is live. Exit revokes it. A new grant revokes the one it replaces.
  • Inside the grant the operator acts as the account owner and holds session oversight: a member's private session opens. Routes that create access outliving the grant (tokens, members, SSO, shares, connections) answer 403.
  • The customer's audit log records admin.impersonate.start, .stop, one admin.impersonate.action per write, and project.admin_oversight_session_read the first time each private session opens in an hour (per API task).
select created_at, action, actor_user_id, metadata
from kortix.audit_events
where account_id = '<account_id>' and action like 'admin.impersonate.%'
order by created_at desc;

Contract: flows IMP-1 and IMP-2 (pnpm test -- --id IMP-2).

Penetration test findings

The register of third-party pentest findings. One row per finding, with its status and the evidence. An accepted risk names the reason and the control that limits it. The report itself stays out of the repository: it holds tokens and account ids.

Web app pentest, July 2026 (scope: dev.kortix.com, dev-api.kortix.com)

# Finding Status Evidence
1 BOLA: GET /v1/billing/account-state returned the billing state on membership alone (Medium, CVSS 5.3) Fixed 2026-10-21 The route returns the money fields only when authorize grants billing.read. Every other caller gets the gating view (can_run, plan, entitlements). Flow BILL-21. Since 2026-08-19 every built-in account role holds billing.read, so a plain member reading the state is intended.
2 Account name accepts HTML (Informational) Fixed 2026-10-21 accountNameError refuses <, > and control characters on create and rename. Every email template escapes the name (escapeHtml). Flow ACCT-4.
3 JWTs signed with HS256 (Informational) Staging fixed 2026-10-21; prod after the next release Every hosted project signs user tokens with ES256 since 2026-08-21. 2026-10-21: dev, staging and prod moved to sb_publishable_ / sb_secret_ keys with zero downtime (325 probe checks, 0 failures), and the API stopped trusting the legacy secret itself (random SUPABASE_JWT_SECRET in every hosted env). Staging: legacy API keys disabled and the HS256 secret revoked; a token forged with the old secret for a real session gets 403 from Supabase and 401 from the API. Prod and dev wait for the mobile app to ship the publishable key. Procedure: references/supabase-legacy-key-retirement.md.
4 Concurrent logins allowed (Informational) Accepted Users run the web app, desktop, CLI and mobile at once; a one-session rule breaks that. Controls: account MFA enforcement, SSO enforcement, admins list and revoke any member session (GET /v1/accounts/:accountId/iam/sessions, POST …/iam/sessions/:sessionId/revoke).
5 Session cookie without Secure (Informational) Fixed apps/web/src/lib/supabase/client.ts and server.ts set Secure on HTTPS. HSTS is on at the edge.
6 Session cookie without HttpOnly (Informational) Accepted The Supabase browser client reads the session from JavaScript (client.ts comment). Controls: React output encoding, server-side input validation (#2), SameSite=Lax, short-lived access tokens. Removing it means a server-only session, a separate project.