compliance
Customer-facing compliance duties that code runs: the subprocessor list and its automatic 30-day DPA notice, Terms of Service changes, customer logo use (publicity), and the audit evidence it leaves.
SKILL.md.agents/skills/compliance/SKILL.md
GitHubCompliance
The Data Processing Addendum (DPA) promises three things that code keeps:
- Section 7.2 / Annex III:
/legal/subprocessorslists every third party that processes customer personal data. - Section 7.3: a new subprocessor gets at least 30 days' notice before it processes customer personal data.
- The DPA and the Data Retention Policy: a terminated account's personal data is deleted within 90 days of the termination (section "Delete a terminated account within 90 days").
Add a subprocessor
A new vendor that sees customer data is a subprocessor: a model provider for Kortix-managed models, a host, an email, log or analytics vendor. A model a customer reaches with their own key is not one.
- Sign or accept the vendor's DPA. For an inference vendor, confirm zero data retention for our account.
- Add the row to
packages/shared/src/subprocessors.ts. Use the vendor's legal entity name from its terms. SetaddedOnto the day the PR merges. MoveSUBPROCESSORS_UPDATEDto the same day. - Merge to
dev. The row ships with the next prod release. - Send the vendor no customer data before the row's effective date
(
addedOn+ 37 days). The page shows it as "From <date>". Managed-model inference is served by Platinum Inference: give the Platinum team the same date, and Platinum Inference holds the change back until then.
A change to an existing row (purpose, location) needs no addedOn and sends
no email. Removing a vendor needs no notice: delete the row.
What runs by itself
runSubprocessorNoticeSweep (apps/api/src/billing/services/subprocessor-notices.ts)
runs hourly in the billing worker, on prod only (INTERNAL_KORTIX_ENV=prod).
- A row is open from the first sweep that sees it on prod until its effective date. The release has 7 days to reach prod, so every customer gets 30 to 37 days.
- Each open notice goes once to the owners and admins of every paid account
(
credit_accounts.tiernotfreeornone). Reply-To is privacy@kortix.com: a reply is an objection. - Each notified account gets an audit event
legal.subprocessor_notice.sent(resource_id=addedOn,output_summary= recipient count, effective date, vendor names). The customer sees it in the account's audit log. - privacy@kortix.com gets one report per sweep that sent. Subject "Subprocessor
notice gave only N days" means the release took more than 7 days: hold the
vendor until 30 days after that report and move
addedOn.
Evidence for an auditor
kortix.audit_events holds the last 14 days (HOT_DAYS,
apps/api/src/shared/audit-archive/format.ts). Older weeks, up to 365 days,
are in the account's archive: read them with
GET /v1/accounts/<account_id>/audit/export?action=legal.subprocessor_notice.sent
(owner or admin, Enterprise), or from the <env>-audit-archive bucket
(audit/<account_id>/<yyyy>/<week>.<part>.jsonl.gz). The query below finds
the last 14 days only.
select account_id, created_at, output_summary
from kortix.audit_events
where action = 'legal.subprocessor_notice.sent' and resource_id = '<addedOn>'
order by created_at;
The privacy@kortix.com reports give the per-sweep totals.
Tests
apps/api/src/__tests__/integration-subprocessor-notices.test.ts:
pnpm test -- --db-only integration-subprocessor-notices.
Change the Terms of Service
The text is apps/web/src/app/[locale]/(public)/(seo)/legal/terms-of-service.ts.
The version is packages/shared/src/terms.ts.
Terms section 16: a material change needs 30 days' notice to self-serve customers. A signed Order keeps the Terms version it names.
- Edit the text. Update the version line at the top of
TERMS_OF_SERVICE. - In
terms.ts: moveTERMS_PREVIOUS_VERSIONto the old version, setTERMS_VERSIONto the merge day andTERMS_EFFECTIVE37 days later. - If the change affects what a person accepts at signup, change the
consent line too (
packages/ui/src/internal/auth/auth-card-shell.tsx). The publicity clause has no line of its own on/auth; the Terms carry it. - Merge to
dev. The notice ships with the next prod release.
Kortix does not email a Terms change to its users. A sweep that emailed
every signed-up user (#11004) used up the SES 24-hour quota and the Resend
monthly quota on 2026-10-29, and magic-link sign-in failed on prod until it
was removed. Bulk mail never goes through the transactional email chain:
that chain carries sign-in mail. Past sends keep their
legal.terms_notice.sent audit events.
Customer logos (Terms section 10, from version 2026-10-28)
The clause covers every account on every plan, free plans and trials
included. Kortix may show the name and logo of the customer's organization,
also one known only from a user's email domain, in customer lists. It never
publishes the name of an individual person, and never a quote, case study or
endorsement without written approval. An opt-out arrives at legal@kortix.com:
remove the name and logo from Kortix websites within 30 days. Never use a
logo before TERMS_EFFECTIVE, or for a customer whose signed Order excludes
it.
Delete a terminated account within 90 days
Terminated means closed (decision D6b, 2026-10-14): an open
kortix.account_deletion_requests row. POST /v1/account/request-deletion
writes it with a 14-day grace; deleting the auth user writes it due now. The
account closes at scheduled_for. A plan cancellation, a downgrade to Free, a
payment failure or an idle account is not a termination.
Two workers delete a closed account, both through runAccountDeletion
(apps/api/src/billing/services/account-deletion.ts):
account-deletion(every 15 min): a request due within the last 2 days.retention-erasure(daily,apps/api/src/billing/services/retention-erasure.ts): every request still openRETENTION_ERASURE_AFTER_DAYS(default 80) afterscheduled_for. It skips an account that still acts live (a paid plan whose payment is not cancelled, or a session or turn after the close) and recordsskipped_livefor a person.
RETENTION_ERASURE_MODE: dry_run (default) records would_erase and
deletes nothing; execute deletes; off stops the tick.
ACCOUNT_DELETION_SWEEP_PAUSED=true forces dry_run.
Monthly evidence
One kortix.retention_erasures row per account, UTC day and mode: ids, dates,
outcome, no personal data. It outlives the account.
select account_id, request_id, requested_at, closed_at, run_on, mode, outcome, error,
run_on - closed_at::date as days_after_close
from kortix.retention_erasures
where run_on >= date '<YYYY-MM-01>' and run_on < date '<YYYY-MM-01>' + interval '1 month'
order by run_on, account_id;
An erased row is the proof. A failed or skipped_live row past day 80 is
an open item for a person: fix the failure, or decide the live account.
Tests: pnpm test -- --db-only integration-retention-erasure.
Staff access to a customer account (act-as)
A platform admin enters a customer account only through an act-as grant
(kortix.impersonation_grants, apps/api/src/shared/impersonation.ts). There
is no other door: the read-only x-kortix-admin-bypass header was retired on
2026-10-19 and the API ignores it.
- Two entry points, one grant: Admin → Accounts → Open as account
(
{account_id}), and "Open as admin" on a project's access screen ({project_id}; the API resolves the project's account). - A grant lives at most 1 hour. The web app shows a banner while it is live. Exit revokes it. A new grant revokes the one it replaces.
- Inside the grant the operator acts as the account owner and holds session oversight: a member's private session opens. Routes that create access outliving the grant (tokens, members, SSO, shares, connections) answer 403.
- The customer's audit log records
admin.impersonate.start,.stop, oneadmin.impersonate.actionper write, andproject.admin_oversight_session_readthe first time each private session opens in an hour (per API task).
select created_at, action, actor_user_id, metadata
from kortix.audit_events
where account_id = '<account_id>' and action like 'admin.impersonate.%'
order by created_at desc;
That query reaches 14 days back. Older events: the export,
GET /v1/accounts/<account_id>/audit/export?action=admin.impersonate..
Contract: flows IMP-1 and IMP-2 (pnpm test -- --id IMP-2).
Penetration test findings
The register of third-party pentest findings. One row per finding, with its status and the evidence. An accepted risk names the reason and the control that limits it. The report itself stays out of the repository: it holds tokens and account ids.
Web app pentest, July 2026 (scope: dev.kortix.com, dev-api.kortix.com)
| # | Finding | Status | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | BOLA: GET /v1/billing/account-state returned the billing state on membership alone (Medium, CVSS 5.3) |
Fixed 2026-10-21 | The route returns the money fields only when authorize grants billing.read. Every other caller gets the gating view (can_run, plan, entitlements). Flow BILL-21. Since 2026-08-19 every built-in account role holds billing.read, so a plain member reading the state is intended. |
| 2 | Account name accepts HTML (Informational) | Fixed 2026-10-21 | accountNameError refuses <, > and control characters on create and rename. Every email template escapes the name (escapeHtml). Flow ACCT-4. |
| 3 | JWTs signed with HS256 (Informational) | Staging fixed 2026-10-21; prod after the next release | Every hosted project signs user tokens with ES256 since 2026-08-21. 2026-10-21: dev, staging and prod moved to sb_publishable_ / sb_secret_ keys with zero downtime (325 probe checks, 0 failures), and the API stopped trusting the legacy secret itself (random SUPABASE_JWT_SECRET in every hosted env). Staging: legacy API keys disabled and the HS256 secret revoked; a token forged with the old secret for a real session gets 403 from Supabase and 401 from the API. Prod and dev wait for the mobile app to ship the publishable key. Procedure: references/supabase-legacy-key-retirement.md. |
| 4 | Concurrent logins allowed (Informational) | Accepted | Users run the web app, desktop, CLI and mobile at once; a one-session rule breaks that. Controls: account MFA enforcement, SSO enforcement, admins list and revoke any member session (GET /v1/accounts/:accountId/iam/sessions, POST …/iam/sessions/:sessionId/revoke). |
| 5 | Session cookie without Secure (Informational) |
Fixed | apps/web/src/lib/supabase/client.ts and server.ts set Secure on HTTPS. HSTS is on at the edge. |
| 6 | Session cookie without HttpOnly (Informational) |
Accepted | The Supabase browser client reads the session from JavaScript (client.ts comment). Controls: React output encoding, server-side input validation (#2), SameSite=Lax, short-lived access tokens. Removing it means a server-only session, a separate project. |