cloud-trail
Cloud Trail.
SKILL.mdskills/cloud-trail/SKILL.md
GitHub| | CloudTrail | AWS service that records API calls made to AWS services, providing an audit trail of actions taken by users, roles, and services | | Management Events | CloudTrail events for control plane operations like creating resources, modifying IAM, and configuring services | | Data Events | CloudTrail events for data plane operations like S3 object access and Lambda function invocations, providing granular activity logging | | Log File Validation | CloudTrail feature that creates a digest file for verifying that log files have not been tampered with after delivery | | CloudTrail Lake | Managed data lake for CloudTrail events enabling SQL-based queries without managing Athena tables or S3 data | | Organization Trail | Single trail that captures API activity across all accounts in an AWS Organization to a central S3 bucket |
Tools & Systems
- Amazon Athena: Serverless SQL query engine for analyzing CloudTrail logs stored in S3 at scale
- CloudWatch Logs Insights: Real-time log query service for interactive CloudTrail analysis within the last 30 days
- CloudTrail Lake: Managed event data lake with built-in SQL query capabilities and 7-year retention
- Amazon Security Lake: Centralized security data lake that normalizes CloudTrail data into OCSF format for SIEM consumption
- AWS CloudTrail: Core audit logging service capturing all API activity across AWS accounts and services
Common Scenarios
Scenario: Investigating an IAM Credential Compromise Through CloudTrail
Context: GuardDuty alerts on UnauthorizedAccess:IAMUser/MaliciousIPCaller for a developer's access key. The security team needs to trace all actions taken by the compromised credential.
Approach:
- Query CloudTrail for all events by the compromised AccessKeyId across all regions
- Build a timeline of API calls to understand the attack sequence
- Identify the initial access point (when did the key first appear from a malicious IP)
- Map all resources created, modified, or accessed by the attacker
- Check for persistence mechanisms (new users, access keys, Lambda functions, EC2 instances)
- Verify CloudTrail was not tampered with (check for StopLogging or UpdateTrail events)
- Document the full attack chain and scope of impact for the incident response report
Pitfalls: CloudTrail events can take up to 15 minutes to appear in S3 and CloudWatch Logs. For real-time visibility during active incidents, use CloudTrail Lake or CloudWatch Logs Insights rather than Athena queries against S3. Cross-region attacks require querying multiple region partitions in Athena.
Output Format
CloudTrail Security Analysis Report
======================================
Account: 123456789012
Analysis Period: 2026-02-16 to 2026-02-23
Trail: org-security-trail (organization-wide)
SECURITY EVENTS DETECTED:
Root account logins: 2
Console logins without MFA: 7
Privilege escalation attempts: 12
CloudTrail configuration changes: 0
Security group modifications: 34
Unauthorized API calls: 156
HIGH-PRIORITY FINDINGS:
[CT-001] Console Login Without MFA
User: admin-user
Time: 2026-02-22T14:30:00Z
IP: 203.0.113.50
Action Required: Enforce MFA via IAM policy
[CT-002] IAM Privilege Escalation
User: dev-user
Time: 2026-02-23T03:15:00Z
Events: CreatePolicyVersion -> AttachRolePolicy
IP: 185.x.x.x (suspicious)
Action Required: Investigate credential compromise
ALERTING STATUS:
CIS metric filters configured: 14 / 14
CloudWatch alarms active: 14 / 14
Alerts fired (last 7 days): 8