cloud-ir-respond
Cloud Ir Ir Respond.
SKILL.mdskills/cloud-ir-respond/SKILL.md
GitHub| | IMDS (Instance Metadata Service) | Cloud service providing instance credentials accessible from within a VM; SSRF attacks target IMDS to steal tokens | | CloudTrail | AWS service logging all API calls across the AWS account; primary evidence source for AWS incident response | | Service Principal | Non-human identity in Azure AD used by applications and services; compromise enables persistent API access | | SCP (Service Control Policy) | AWS Organizations policy that limits the maximum permissions available to accounts; useful for guardrails | | Ephemeral Infrastructure | Cloud resources (containers, functions, auto-scaled instances) that may be terminated before evidence can be collected | | Cross-Account Role Assumption | AWS mechanism allowing one account to temporarily access resources in another; attackers pivot through assumed roles |
Tools & Systems
- AWS CloudTrail / Azure Activity Logs / GCP Audit Logs: Cloud-native API logging services providing the primary audit trail
- Cado Response: Cloud-native forensics platform for automated evidence capture from AWS, Azure, and GCP
- Prowler (AWS) / ScoutSuite (multi-cloud): Open-source cloud security assessment tools for post-incident posture review
- Steampipe: Open-source SQL-based tool for querying cloud APIs to investigate IAM configurations and resource states
- Cartography (Lyft): Open-source tool for mapping cloud infrastructure relationships and identifying attack paths
Common Scenarios
Scenario: AWS Access Key Compromised via Public GitHub Repository
Context: AWS GuardDuty alerts on API calls from an unexpected IP address using an IAM user's access key. The key was accidentally committed to a public GitHub repository 4 hours ago.
Approach:
- Immediately disable the compromised access key via AWS IAM
- Attach AWSDenyAll policy to the affected IAM user
- Query CloudTrail for all API calls made with the compromised key since exposure
- Identify resources created or modified by the attacker (EC2 instances for crypto-mining, new IAM users for persistence)
- Terminate unauthorized resources and remove backdoor IAM entities
- Rotate all credentials the compromised user had access to
- Enable GitHub secret scanning to prevent future credential leaks
Pitfalls:
- Only disabling the access key without checking for new access keys or IAM users created as persistence
- Not checking all AWS regions for attacker-created resources (crypto-miners deployed in every region)
- Forgetting to revoke temporary credentials from assumed roles (STS tokens remain valid until expiry)
- Not calculating the financial impact of unauthorized resource usage for insurance claims
Output Format
CLOUD INCIDENT RESPONSE REPORT
================================
Incident: INC-2025-1705
Cloud Provider: AWS (Account: 123456789012)
Date Detected: 2025-11-15T14:00:00Z
Detection Source: GuardDuty - UnauthorizedAccess:IAMUser/InstanceCredentialExfiltration
COMPROMISE SUMMARY
Initial Access: IAM access key exposed in public GitHub repo
Affected Identity: iam-user: deploy-bot (AKIA...)
Attacker IP: 203.0.113.42 (VPN exit node, Netherlands)
Duration: 4 hours (10:00 UTC - 14:00 UTC)
ATTACKER ACTIVITY (from CloudTrail)
10:15 UTC - DescribeInstances (reconnaissance)
10:18 UTC - RunInstances x 12 (c5.4xlarge, all regions - crypto-mining)
10:22 UTC - CreateUser "backup-admin" (persistence)
10:23 UTC - CreateAccessKey for "backup-admin"
10:25 UTC - AttachUserPolicy - AdministratorAccess to "backup-admin"
10:30 UTC - PutBucketPolicy - s3://data-bucket made public (exfiltration)
CONTAINMENT ACTIONS
[x] Original access key disabled
[x] User policy set to AWSDenyAll
[x] Backdoor IAM user "backup-admin" deleted
[x] 12 crypto-mining instances terminated (all regions)
[x] S3 bucket policy restored to private
FINANCIAL IMPACT
Unauthorized EC2: $2,847 (4 hours x 12 x c5.4xlarge)
Data Transfer: $127 (S3 public access data egress)
Total: $2,974
POST-INCIDENT HARDENING
1. GitHub secret scanning enabled
2. Access key rotation policy implemented
3. SCP preventing CloudTrail disablement deployed
4. GuardDuty auto-remediation Lambda configured