menuyukti-graphql-security-audit
Evidence-based GraphQL API security audit for MenuYukti (apps/graphql and trusted callers in apps/web and apps/agents). Evaluates identity trust, authorization / IDOR / tenant isolation, abuse control
SKILL.md.agents/skills/menuyukti-graphql-security-audit/SKILL.md
GitHubMenuYukti GraphQL Security Audit
Skill version: 1.0.0
Scoring version: 1.0.0 (see references/scoring-methodology.md)
Purpose: Engineering security assessment of the GraphQL API and its trust boundaries — not a penetration test, legal opinion, or production red-team engagement.
Companion skills: menuyukti-graphql (layout), graphql-architect (generic GraphQL security patterns in references/security.md), auth conventions in .cursor/rules/python-graphql-conventions.mdc.
Do not run an audit unless requested
Creating or updating this skill is not an audit. Run an audit only when the user explicitly asks for FULL, DELTA, or FOCUSED mode.
Primary questions every audit must answer
- Can an unauthenticated or spoofed caller reach GraphQL operations that should require a real user?
- Can user A read or mutate location/workspace/CRM/POS/analytics data belonging to user B (IDOR / tenant isolation)?
- Are query abuse controls (depth, complexity, aliases, tokens, field selection) present and effective?
- Does the API leak sensitive schema, stack traces, or cross-tenant existence signals?
- Are JSON/
Nodeand other flexible inputs safe against mass-assignment / injection style abuse? - Is the BFF / agents trust model (
X-User-Id+X-Internal-Api-Key) correctly enforced end-to-end? - How has the risk posture changed since the previous comparable audit?
- What is the minimum remediation set to clear P0/P1 findings?
Every comparable audit produces an evidence-backed score 0–100 from the current repository state. Never reuse prior conclusions without re-verification.
Audit execution safety (mandatory)
Read-only with respect to application source and operational systems.
| Allowed | Forbidden without explicit approval |
|---|---|
| Repository inspection | Application source modification |
| Safe static analysis | Production DB changes |
| Safe local tests (existing suite, no destructive fixtures) | Live attacks against production / shared staging without approval |
Report generation under backlog/docs/audits/graphql-security/ |
Exfiltrating secrets, sending tenant data externally |
| Historical comparison | Dependency installs, deployments, credential rotation |
Do not invent exploit PoCs that write payloads or attack procedures into the repo. Describe risk and remediation at a high level; cite code paths as evidence. Record any test that could not run and why.
Audit modes
FULL AUDIT
Inspect the GraphQL API, auth helpers, server middleware, representative queries/mutations across domains, and trusted callers (apps/web GraphQL client + BFF, apps/agents graphql_post).
Produce all reports, overwrite backlog/docs/audits/graphql-security/latest/, and write an immutable snapshot under history/.
DELTA AUDIT
Compare current codebase to the previous comparable full (or last full-baseline) audit.
Identify: improvements, resolved issues, new problems, regressions, score changes, new risk blockers. Revalidate affected workflows; do not assume a finding is resolved because code changed.
Recalculate only categories with sufficient current evidence; label other category scores historical.
FOCUSED AUDIT
Target one or more scopes:
identity | authorization | abuse-controls | disclosure | injection | secrets | trust-boundary | testing
Generate findings for the scope. Do not replace the most recent full-audit baseline scorecard. Store focused outputs under history/ with mode FOCUSED and update progress.md only for scoped notes.
Category weights (fixed — scoring v1.0.0)
| Category | Weight |
|---|---|
| Identity and authentication trust | 20% |
| Authorization / IDOR / tenant isolation | 30% |
| Abuse and DoS controls | 10% |
| Information disclosure | 10% |
| Injection and unsafe resolvers | 10% |
| Secrets and sensitive data handling | 5% |
| Client / BFF / agents trust boundary | 10% |
| Authz automated testing | 5% |
| TOTAL | 100% |
Overall = Σ(CategoryScore × Weight / 100)
If any weighted category lacks sufficient evidence, report a provisional overall score or UNKNOWN and state whether a reliable overall score can be calculated.
Evidence rules
Never score from field names, TODOs, docs claims, or “looks guarded” alone.
Trace each check through the request path: caller → (optional BFF) → GraphQL context → auth helper → DB filter / ownership check → response.
For every finding record fields in references/audit-report-schema.md.
Statuses: VERIFIED | IMPLEMENTED_NOT_TESTED | PARTIAL | MISSING | UNKNOWN | NOT_APPLICABLE
Do not invent evidence. Distinguish code inspection, automated tests, and operational verification.
Risk decision (independent of score)
Emit exactly one: ACCEPTABLE | CONDITIONAL | AT RISK | INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE
- Confirmed unresolved P0 (auth bypass, cross-tenant read/write, internal key optional in prod-like config, trivial IDOR on money/PII) → cannot be
ACCEPTABLE(AT RISKorCONDITIONALwith blockers listed). - Unverified mandatory controls → cannot be unconditional
ACCEPTABLE. - High score cannot override P0 blockers.
Execution workflow
Copy and track:
Audit Progress:
- [ ] 1. Confirm mode (FULL | DELTA | FOCUSED) and scopes
- [ ] 2. Capture git metadata (branch, SHA, dirty flag)
- [ ] 3. Load prior comparable audit (if any) from history/
- [ ] 4. Inspect identity path (server context, internal key middleware)
- [ ] 5. Sample authorization across location/workspace/CRM/POS/analytics/Node APIs
- [ ] 6. Verify abuse extensions and limits
- [ ] 7. Review error shaping, introspection, public surfaces
- [ ] 8. Review flexible inputs (Node JSON, bulk mutations) and secrets handling
- [ ] 9. Trace web BFF + agents callers for header trust assumptions
- [ ] 10. Inventory authz tests (positive + negative / cross-tenant)
- [ ] 11. Score categories with check IDs from scoring-methodology.md
- [ ] 12. Evaluate attack scenarios (FULL; subset for FOCUSED)
- [ ] 13. Compute risk decision
- [ ] 14. Write reports from templates/ into latest/ + history/
- [ ] 15. Update progress.md (FULL / comparable DELTA only)
- [ ] 16. Validate report completeness against audit-report-schema.md
Repo map (starting points)
| Area | Paths |
|---|---|
| ASGI / context | apps/graphql/server.py, apps/graphql/context.py |
| Auth helpers | apps/graphql/schema/auth.py, apps/graphql/access.py |
| Limits / complexity | apps/graphql/limits.py, apps/graphql/schema/__init__.py, schema/query_complexity.py |
| Queries / mutations | apps/graphql/schema/queries/, apps/graphql/schema/mutations/ |
| Node handlers | apps/graphql/schema/node_handlers/ |
| CRM public / customer | apps/graphql CRM routes (/crm/v1/…), related schema modules |
| Tests | apps/graphql/tests/ (esp. cross-user contexts), apps/graphql/tests/auth_context.py |
| Web BFF client | apps/web/lib/graphql/client.ts, apps/web/app/api/** |
| Agents caller | apps/agents GraphQL HTTP helpers (graphql_post or equivalent) |
| Conventions | .cursor/rules/python-graphql-conventions.mdc |
Expand search as needed; do not limit evidence to this map.
Attack scenarios (minimum set)
- Spoofed
X-User-Idwithout valid internal API key (or with key leaked) - Authenticated user A passes user B’s
locationId/ analytics run id / node id - Mutation without
require_location_owner/ workspace check - Query returns empty for denial but nested fields still resolve foreign data
- Batch / aliased query to bypass complexity or amplify cost
- Introspection or error extensions leak internals in production config
- Flexible
Node/ JSON create-update mass-assigns privileged fields - Agents or web BFF forwards attacker-controlled user id
- CRM public path bypasses internal key and escalates to operator data
- ID enumeration via sequential integer IDs + distinguishable error responses
Details: references/attack-scenarios.md, references/checklist.md.
Sampling strategy (authorization)
For FULL audits, do not claim 100% resolver coverage unless enumerated. Instead:
- Inventory root Query/Mutation mixins from
schema/query.py/schema/mutation.py. - Classify each as: location-scoped, workspace-scoped, user-scoped, public/CRM, internal/admin, or unclear.
- Deep-inspect a representative sample plus any high-risk domains (POS money, CRM PII, delete mutations, bulk upserts, analytics runs).
- Flag unsampled mixins as residual risk in
executive-summary.md(coverage %).
Prefer negative tests (OTHER_USER / foreign location_id) as strongest evidence.
Report outputs
Canonical output root: backlog/docs/audits/graphql-security/
backlog/docs/audits/graphql-security/
├── latest/ # overwritten by FULL (and comparable DELTA that publishes a new baseline)
├── history/YYYY-MM-DD_HH-mm_<commit>/ # immutable
└── progress.md
Fill templates from templates/. Machine-readable snapshot: history/.../audit.json per references/audit-report-schema.md.
Historical audits are immutable. Never overwrite prior history/ snapshots. Use stable finding IDs across audits (FIND-GQL-…).
Do not implement remediation tasks unless the user separately requests implementation.
Progressive disclosure (read when needed)
| Topic | File |
|---|---|
| Check IDs and what to inspect | references/checklist.md |
| Attack scenarios | references/attack-scenarios.md |
| Scoring rubric | references/scoring-methodology.md |
| JSON + markdown report schema | references/audit-report-schema.md |
Templates
- templates/executive-summary.md
- templates/scorecard.md
- templates/findings-register.md
- templates/engineering-roadmap.md
- templates/audit-comparison.md
How to invoke
| Mode | Example user phrasing |
|---|---|
| FULL | “Run a FULL GraphQL security audit” |
| DELTA | “Run a DELTA GraphQL security audit vs last full audit” |
| FOCUSED | “Run a FOCUSED GraphQL security audit on authorization and trust-boundary” |
After each FULL (or comparable DELTA that republishes baseline), update progress.md with score delta, P0 changes, regressions, and risk-decision changes. If scoring methodology version changed, do not show an unqualified score comparison.