e1011-safety
Use when assess HFE safety requirements for a spacecraft operations catalogue under ECSS-E-ST-10-11C §4.6.3: categorize each operation by hazard criticality (critical, high, medium, low), verify that
SKILL.mdskills/space-systems/ecss/e1011-safety/SKILL.md
GitHubECSS Human Factors Engineering — HFE Safety Requirements (space-systems/ecss/e1011-safety)
Use when the task is to assess whether human-factors engineering (HFE) safety requirements have been applied to a spacecraft operations catalogue per ECSS-E-ST-10-11C §4.6.3 — categorizing operations by hazard criticality, checking that the required human-error prevention measures are present at each level, and verifying that safety-critical operator interfaces meet minimum safeguard provisions.
Domain quick reference
- ECSS-E-ST-10-11C §4.6.3 requires every operation in a catalogue to carry a hazard criticality designation and a matched set of human-error prevention measures. Four levels are defined: CRITICAL (consequence is loss of life or mission-ending, typically irreversible), HIGH (major subsystem damage, potentially irreversible), MEDIUM (recoverable damage, reversible), and LOW (no significant safety consequence). Each operation is placed in exactly one level before its required measures are checked.
- Required protection measures scale with criticality. A CRITICAL operation demands all five: confirmation step, interlock, reversibility check, crew notification, and dual verification. A HIGH operation requires the first four (confirmation step, interlock, reversibility check, crew notification) but not dual verification. A MEDIUM operation requires confirmation step and reversibility check only. LOW operations have no mandatory measures under this clause.
- An irreversible operation at HIGH or CRITICAL level is subject to the CRITICAL protection set regardless of its nominal criticality designation, because the consequence of an error cannot be undone. This is a separate check from the nominal measures check; an irreversible HIGH operation that satisfies HIGH-level measures may still be underprotected.
- Safety-critical operator interfaces (CRITICAL and HIGH operations) must additionally provide clear system-state cues (visual or auditory indication of hazardous states) and documented go/no-go criteria. Absence of either is a distinct finding type, independent of the protection-set check.
Workflow
- Inventory every operation in the catalogue and assign it a hazard criticality level (CRITICAL, HIGH, MEDIUM, or LOW) based on consequence severity and reversibility. Any operation without a valid criticality designation must be rejected before the assessment proceeds; it cannot be treated as LOW by default.
- For each operation, retrieve the set of human-error prevention measures on record and compare it against the minimum set required for its criticality level. Record each absent measure as a finding of type MISSING_MEASURE, naming the specific measure and the level that requires it.
- For each CRITICAL or HIGH operation, verify the operator interface carries clear system-state cues and documented go/no-go criteria. Absence of state cues generates a MISSING_STATE_CUES finding; absence of go/no-go criteria generates a MISSING_GO_NOGO finding. These two findings are independent and must both be checked.
- For every irreversible CRITICAL or HIGH operation, confirm the full CRITICAL-level protection set is present. Record any gap as an IRREVERSIBLE_UNDERPROTECTED finding; this supplements any MISSING_MEASURE findings from step 2 and is not merged with them.
- Aggregate all findings per operation. An operation is HFE-safety- compliant only when all four finding types — MISSING_MEASURE, MISSING_STATE_CUES, MISSING_GO_NOGO, IRREVERSIBLE_UNDERPROTECTED — are absent.
- Report the catalogue-level summary: number of operations per criticality level, total findings per type, and the list of non-compliant operations with their open findings.
Pitfalls
- Collapsing "no finding at its nominal criticality" into compliance for an irreversible HIGH operation — the irreversibility check in step 4 is separate from the nominal measures check and catches cases where a HIGH operation satisfies all HIGH-level measures but still lacks the full CRITICAL-level protection that irreversibility demands.
- Treating a MISSING_GO_NOGO finding as redundant when a MISSING_MEASURE finding is already raised for the same operation — the interface requirements (step 3) are independent of the protection-set check (step 2) and both must be reported.
- Assigning a LOW criticality level to an irreversible operation to avoid the CRITICAL protection requirements — criticality must reflect actual consequence severity; a HIGH or CRITICAL consequence that is also irreversible does not become LOW by re-labelling.
- Reading an empty findings list as "assessed and compliant" when the operation record carries no criticality designation — an operation without a level must be flagged as unassessable, not silently treated as passing.
Behavior contract (gate 3)
The criticality categorization, required-measures check, interface requirements check, and irreversibility protection check are exercised by the gate 3 contract test: scripts/test_e1011_safety.py against scripts/e1011_safety_logic.py (stdlib unittest, offline). Run:
python3 scripts/test_e1011_safety.py
Compliance
- ECSS standards are freely downloadable (ESA); cite the source and paraphrase per standards-map.yaml.
- compliance: STANDARDS-REF, gated: false.