Decide from counted evidence, not from an impression

Code calculates. A model reasons. This decides. The pattern is borrowed openly from the decision models now being built for agent systems, and one thing is deliberately different: the confidence here does not come from a model. It comes from evidence you counted. Nothing in this procedure calls out, and nothing about it needs a network.

That difference is the whole reason it can be trusted offline — and the reason step 3 is the one that cannot be skipped.

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1 · Name the decision, and what being wrong costs

Write both before looking at anything. The cost sets the threshold; there is no global one.

"Is this file safe to edit?" Being wrong means the edit is silently discarded. "Does this component already exist?" Being wrong means a wasted afternoon, recoverable. "Is this a credential?" Being wrong once is the whole product failing.

One threshold per action, scaled to that cost. A single number for the whole system is how a gate ends up too strict for cheap mistakes and too loose for expensive ones.

2 · Write the questions before you look

Each question gets a type, and the type is one of three:

type	shape	example
choice	one value from a set you named	generated · hand-written · cannot tell
count	a number, with what it is out of	26 of 28 planted credentials caught
yes/no	with the evidence that decides it	is a test command in this session's log?

Never a free-prose answer. Prose cannot be thresholded, cannot be compared to last week's, and cannot be checked by anybody else. If a question can only be answered in prose, it is not a decision — it is a discussion, and it belongs with a person.

3 · Answer each from something you counted — and record the count

This is the step that makes the rest honest.

A number you did not count is an impression wearing a number's clothes.

Where the counts come from, offline:

question shape	what counts it
is this name used anywhere else	chamnan-where <name> — uses, not lines that mention it
what breaks if this changes	chamnan-impact <file> — importers, covering tests
has this been decided before	chamnan-recall <subject>
does the behaviour hold	the check, run — and seen to fail before it is believed
does it hold on somebody else's code	the corpus, with the count it returns

Record what you EXAMINED, not only what you found. "No references" from a scan that skipped a file is not the same answer as "no references", and the difference is invisible unless the skipped count is on the line. Every report in this procedure carries both numbers.

4 · Three bands, and the middle one is not a failure

band	what happens
the evidence is complete and agrees	act
the evidence is partial, or two signals disagree	say so and continue — name what is missing
the evidence cannot be counted, or being wrong is expensive	hand it to a person

The bottom band is an answer. Routing a decision to a human is the procedure working, not the procedure giving up — and pretending to a number you could not count is the only real failure here.

5 · Test the threshold before trusting it

A threshold nobody has tested is a guess with a number on it.

Find a case where the answer is already known and check the band lands right. Where there is no such case, build one: a repository that has the defect, a file that names a path that has gone. Then break it the other way and confirm the band moves.

A credential-shaped fixture is the one case with a hard boundary, and it is not a style rule. Build it in a throwaway directory outside any repository, or in a corpus repository that exists for the purpose — never in a tracked file, and never anything that can be pushed. GitHub's secret scanning forwards a live-looking key to the provider within minutes of it reaching a remote, and the account that owns it is marked. A test fixture is not worth that, and the damage is not yours to undo. If a threshold can only be tested with a real-looking key, test it against a corpus somebody built for testing rather than against the repository you are working in.

A threshold that has never been seen to reject anything has not been tested, only run.

6 · Log the decision, then compare it with what actually happened

Write down the question, the count, the band and what was done. Later, check whether the decision was right. A threshold that is never compared with the outcome drifts silently, and the drift is only visible against a record.

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7 · Encode the decision in a guard, so nobody decides it again

Steps 1-6 are how a decision gets made once. This is how it stops costing anything afterwards.

A model can reason its way to a good judgement every time — and pays for it every time, in the thinking and in the code it writes to express it. Where the answer is already settled, the cheap form is a guard that carries the decision, not a person or a model re-deriving it.

The prototype. Copy it and change the subject; do not re-invent the shape.

# 1 · the population, DERIVED — never a list you typed
subjects = scan(where)                    # glob, walk, parse — anything but a literal list

# 2 · the measurement is a failure when it finds nothing
assert_that("the scan found the things it judges", len(subjects) >= floor,
            saw=f"{len(subjects)} found — every assertion below is vacuously true on zero, "
                f"which is how a broken measurement reports itself as a pass")

# 3 · one threshold, set by what being wrong costs (step 1), stated here and not in a model
offenders = [s for s in subjects if not holds(s)]

# 4 · the message says what to DO, and names the offender
assert_that("<the property, as a sentence that is true when it passes>", not offenders,
            saw=f"{offenders} — <what goes wrong for the reader if this is false>")

Six decisions it encodes, so they are made once and not per use:

in the prototype	the decision it carries
scan(where)	derive the population; a typed list forgets the member added tomorrow
len(subjects) >= floor	an empty population is a failure, not a quiet pass
offenders as a list	report WHO, not just that something is wrong
saw=	the reader acts without opening the guard
the name as a true sentence	it reads as a property, not as a test id
threshold in the code	not in a prompt, not in a model, not re-argued

Then the one step that makes it real: break the thing and watch it go red. A guard never seen to fail has been run, not tested. If breaking it is impractical, assert the inverse in the same breath — assert_that("...", A and not B) — so a change in either direction is caught.

And the half everybody skips: show it can go GREEN for the right reason. Red proves the guard reacts to something; it does not prove it reacts to the thing you meant, and a guard that can only ever fail is indistinguishable from a broken measurement. So keep a known-good case beside the broken one and check it passes — the same shape a benchmark calls an oracle, a solution shipped with the task so that "nobody can pass this" and "the scorer is broken" stop looking identical.

assert_that("<the property>", holds(known_bad) is False)   # it can go red
assert_that("<the property>", holds(known_good) is True)   # ...for the right reason

The cheap version costs one extra line: whenever you build a fixture that the guard should reject, build its twin that it should accept, and assert both.

Four traps, each of which has produced a guard that passed while measuring nothing:

• searching a whole document for a name that appears in it twice — slice to the region first
• reading a value before the thing that sets it — compute into a name, then assert
• pinning the spelling of an implementation instead of its behaviour — run it and read the outcome; pin text only where there is no runtime signature, and say why
• a mutation that changes no verdict — it proves nothing; find the case that discriminates

What this is not

It is not a gate that blocks. Every decision here ends in an action, a notice, or a person — never in a refusal the reader cannot override. A tool that stops work on a number it could not fully justify will be turned off, and then none of its decisions matter.

It is not for choices with one obvious answer. Running six steps on something a glance settles is overhead dressed as rigour.

It is not a confidence generator. If step 3 has nothing to count, the honest output is the bottom band. Inventing a number to get past it is the one thing this procedure exists to prevent.