iommu

I/O Memory Management Unit (Intel VT-d / AMD-Vi) translates device IOVAs using the Requester ID (BDF) and enforces per-device read/write permissions—the primary software-controlled barrier against o

SKILL.md

GitHub

IOMMU

I/O Memory Management Unit (Intel VT-d / AMD-Vi) translates device IOVAs using the Requester ID (BDF) and enforces per-device read/write permissions—the primary software-controlled barrier against out-of-domain [[dma]] when remapping is active on the device path. Classify the initiator first with [[memory-acquisition-path]]; host-mediated capture and hypervisor EPT events are separate boundaries. A denied IOMMU fault bounds that request on the established path—it does not prove absence of every device or runtime mapping; see [[assurance-boundaries]] for enforcement vs observation limits.

Translation flow

  1. Device issues a Memory TLP with IOVA; header carries 16-bit BDF.
  2. TLP reaches root complex; IOMMU walks I/O page tables (VT-d: Root → Context → SLPT; AMD-Vi: Device Table → I/O PT).
  3. Permission bits checked; success forwards translated physical address; failure logs fault and returns UR/CA.

Translations cache in IOTLB; ATS adds a device-side DevTLB—invalidation must reach both or stale mappings persist.

Isolation primitives

  • IOMMU groups: devices behind a switch share a group unless ACS enables port isolation.
  • ACS (Access Control Services): Source Validation drops spoofed Requester IDs; Translation Blocking blocks AT=10 (translated) TLPs; P2P Request/Completion Redirect forces peer traffic through the IOMMU.
  • Interrupt Remapping: without IR, any bus-master can write MSI addresses to 0xFEE00000 range.
  • ATS-untrusted: disable or block ATS for FPGAs, Thunderbolt enclosures, and other untrusted endpoints—AT=10 (translated) TLPs must not bypass page walks. ATS lets devices cache IOMMU translations in a DevTLB; a malicious endpoint can present arbitrary translated addresses unless policy treats it as untrusted (Linux pci=noats quirks; Windows Kernel DMA Protection per-endpoint—not a blanket guarantee for internal slots).
  • RMRR/IVMD: ACPI DMAR RMRR and AMD IVMD tables declare identity-mapped ranges; audit for suspect BDFs or overlap with game memory regions.

Sample DXE remapping programming appears in [[helloiommupkg]] (learning-only, not production AC).

Six paths to out-of-domain access

# Path Notes
1 IOMMU disabled / not applied BIOS or OS policy gap
2 Pre-boot DMA Before IOMMU init
3 Identity / passthrough domain 1:1 IOVA→PA mapping
4 Driver over-allocation Full 4 KB page maps adjacent kernel data
5 Legitimate-path exfil Spoofed NIC reads own RX ring within mapped IOVAs—invisible to IOMMU layer
6 Kernel table reprogramming [[byovd]] or compromised kernel

Windows PoC [[diedmaprotection]] disables active DMA remapping (IOMMU/VT-d) from kernel mode to restore out-of-domain PCIe access—illustrating path 1/6 when OS policy can be subverted at runtime.

Paths 1–3 underpin most commercial DMA cheats today.

Bypass catalog (16 techniques)

# Technique Mitigation
1 IOMMU disabled Refuse misconfigured platforms
2 Pre-boot DMA UEFI updates; verify ACPI indicators
3 Identity/passthrough domain Strict-mode IOMMU policy
4 Driver over-allocation OS bounce buffers; strict mappings
5 ATS abuse ATS-untrusted for non-allowlisted endpoints
6 ACS missing on bridge Verify SV, TB, RR, CR on all bridges
7 Lazy IOTLB invalidation Strict invalidation mode
8 FLR race Synchronized FLR handling
9 SMM bypass Boot Guard / Platform Secure Boot
10 DMA-remapping driver bugs OS patching
11 Hypervisor trust failure Platform remediation; boot evidence ≠ runtime proof
12 Interrupt injection (no IR) Mandatory interrupt remapping
13 RMRR/IVMD scope abuse Measured boot; runtime RMRR audit
14 Snoop-bit manipulation Strict snoop enforcement
15 PASID confusion PASID-aware IOMMU programming
16 DMAR/IVRS spoofing Measured boot covering firmware

Techniques 1–6 are the active surface for most commercial DMA cheats; 7–13 appear in academic, APT, or firmware contexts; 14–16 are largely theoretical. Concrete runtime DMAR spoofing via DMA appears in [[vtd-bypass]] (LeechCore/FPGA physical writes; XSDT/DMAR fabrication and boot-window timed patches so firmware-disabled VT-d reads as enabled).

Defense uses

  • Windows kernel driver [[dmaprotect]] programs VT-d/AMD-Vi remapping tables to block unauthorized PCIe DMA while permitting legitimate device domains—defensive runtime counterpart to [[diedmaprotection]].
  • Strict domains instead of identity/passthrough mappings
  • Fault-rate monitoring (VT-d Fault Recording, AMD-Vi Event Log, WHEA)
  • Live containment: sandbox domain remapping, Bus Master Enable clear, Downstream Port Containment (DPC)—use OS-managed lifecycle; remapping, BME, and DPC differ in prerequisites and scope
  • Pre-game audit: passthrough domains, oversized IOMMU groups, RMRR overlap with game memory
  • Per-device fault rate: sustained faults need driver-bug and reset exclusions before attributing malicious out-of-domain access
  • Lab setup guides such as [[kvm-gpu-passthrough]] (BigAnteater; Arch Linux GRUB/libvirt/QEMU templates; IOMMU/VT-d and AMD/Intel BIOS prerequisites for GPU passthrough VMs) document the host-side isolation topology researchers must validate before assigning devices to VFIO guests.

State verification

Claims that IOMMU is "enabled" or that KDP covers a device require separating four properties: ACPI advertisement (DMAR/IVRS), Windows policy (KDP, per-device DMA Remapping Policy), live unit state, and requester coverage. KDP On does not prove every internal endpoint is remapped; a valid ACPI table does not prove runtime mappings. See [[iommu-state-verification]] for the evidence checklist and read-only collection discipline.

Limits

Misconfigured BIOS, pre-boot DMA, ACS holes, ATS abuse, over-mapped pages, legitimate-path exfil, or kernel compromise reprogramming tables can defeat IOMMU alone—hence layered PCIe fingerprinting, hypervisor EPT, and TPM/measured-boot attestation with [[hvci]].

Related

[[dma]] · [[memory-acquisition-path]] · [[assurance-boundaries]] · [[iommu-state-verification]] · [[helloiommupkg]] · [[dmaprotect]] · [[diedmaprotection]] · [[kvm-gpu-passthrough]] · [[byovd]] · [[hvci]] · [[overviews/dma-attack]] · [[overviews/anti-cheat]]